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Analysis of Credit Enhancement of Financing Guarantee Company (FGC)
ZHANG Tiewei
Abstract
In China, the financing problem of SMEs has been concerned for a long time,
but it has not been solved effectively. At present, the development of financing
guarantee companies (FGCs) providing credit enhancement services for SMEs is
facing severe challenges. Essentially, financing guarantee is a special kind of
creditor’s right (debt investor’s rights). The essence of creditor's right is the seller
position of put options. Because the return-risk structure of creditor's right is
seriously asymmetric, debt investors should follow the prudent and conservative
operating principle. The "5Ws" principle or "5Cs" principle of bank loan business is
the embodiment of this prudent and conservative principle. When selecting investee,
debt security (bond) investors should follow the strict "exclusion-rejection"
procedure, which is the direct requirement of the prudent and conservative principle
in debt investment. Financing guarantee can be regarded as a non-standard debt
security. Because of the higher risk of its clients of SMEs, the strictest principle of
prudence and conservatism must be abided by in the operation of financing
guarantee business, namely the zero-loss-principle. As a credit risk management
instrument, financing guarantee has both links and differences with credit default
swaps (CDS) and credit insurance. The essential difference is that financing
guarantee must follow the zero-loss-principle, while CDS and credit insurance
follow the principle of "expected loss less than expected return".
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There is a match between the zero-loss-principle of credit enhancement
business and the spirit of doer. The zero-loss-principle requires the FGC to strictly
examine and screen the clients (entrepreneurs) and select the right clients at the very
beginning. The spirit of doer usually refers to a dedicated character that takes the
enterprising philosophy of " If others succeed by exerting one ounce of effort, I will
exert a hundred times as much effort" as the core and seeks the right thing as
practical, deep, long-term, capable and excellent as possible. The spirit of doer can
increase enterprise value and reduce credit risk of financing guarantee business
through learning curve effect, human capital effect and social capital effect. Through
case study, it finds that FGC must refuse the actual controllers who do not focus on
the business directly. Because opportunists are highly likely to fail in business, and
once their business fails, the possibility of the FGC fully exercising its right of
recourse after compensation is very low. Even before default, these opportunists
have various countermeasures against recourse or claims.
There is a match between the zero-loss-principle of credit enhancement
business and market competitiveness. Market competitiveness can improve the
profitability, solvency and sustainability of enterprises. Enterprises with market
competitiveness can improve EBITDA by raising prices or expanding sales, which
can improve the short-term solvency of enterprises and reduce the risk of financing
guarantee business. The case study finds that the enterprise market competitiveness
can be measured objectively and quickly by using two indicators of customer
iii
concentration and net profit margin.
There is a match between the zero-loss-principle of credit enhancement
business and technical suitability. Technology is a means of transforming input into
output in the process of production, and technological suitability is the organic unity
of technological advancement and efficiency. The principles and methods of
technology suitability evaluation are completely consistent with those of enterprise
value evaluation, that is, to maximize the net present value or the internal rate of
return. The case study finds that two indicators of return on assets (ROA) and
average wage can grasp the degree of technical suitability quickly.
With the zero-loss-principle of financing guarantee business as the core, there is
an organic unity among doer spirit, market competitiveness and technical suitability.
Among them, the spirit of doer is the commander-in-chief, technical suitability is the
means, and market competitiveness is the driving force and guidance. The
three-factor credit enhancement model can explain the vicissitudes of China's
financing guarantee industry, and can guide the FGCs to manage each financing
guarantee business.
Keywords: Financing Guarantee Company (FGC), Zero-loss-principle, Doer Spirit,
Market Competitiveness, Technical Suitability
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1Chapter I Introduction
Financing guarantee companies (FGCs) mainly serve small and medium-sized
private enterprises (SMEs). Firstly, the current financial system in China, which
mainly focuses on direct financing and debt financing, is taken as the logical starting
point of the theoretical analysis. Then, the external and internal causes of financing
difficulties of private SMEs are analyzed. Finally, from the point of view of credit
risk management, financing guarantee is regarded as a special kind of credit risk
management instruments, which provides a clear perspective and focus for the
subsequent chapters.
1.1 Main Topics of the Background
China's indirect financing system and debt financing system aggravate the
financing difficulties of SMEs. The financing guarantee of SMEs can be analyzed
from the perspective of credit risk transferring instruments. At present, China's
SMEs financing guarantee system needs to be improved urgently. These pre-existing
conditions constitute the financial background and logical starting point of this study.
I. China's Financial System and Financing Difficulties of SMEs
The financing difficulty of SMEs is a worldwide problem. In China's traditional
financial system, which is characterized by indirect financing and creditor's rights
financing, imperfect credit system and lack of credit risk transfer tools, the financing
problem of SMEs is more severe.
2i Characteristics of China's Financial System
At present, China's financial system is characterized by indirect financing is
dominant while direct financing is weak, debt financing as the main component
while equity financing lags behind, lack of market-oriented credit risk management
instruments, lagging credit information system and high credit risks.
1. Dominant Indirect Financing and Weak Direct Financing
At present, China's finance is still a separate mode, mainly including banking,
trust, insurance and securities. As shown in Figure 1-1, the total assets of banking
financial institutions reached 261.4 trillion yuan at the end of 2018, trust financial
institutions reached 23.14 trillion yuan, and insurance financial institutions reached
18.33 trillion yuan, the market value of stocks, which represents the securities
industry, with a scale of 43.03 trillion yuan at the end of 2018. The above four
sectors accounted for 75.6%, 6.7%, 5.3% and 12.4% respectively. Banking financial
institutions were in the leading position. The market value of the stock market,
which represents direct financing, only accounted for 12.4% of the stock of major
financial assets.
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Figure 1-1 Scale and proportion of assets in various sectors of China's financial
system in 2018
Commercial banks, insurance institutions and trust companies are typical
financial intermediaries with indirect financing as the main business, and their
financial liabilities and assets are mainly debt instruments rather than equity. The
financial system dominated by indirect financing, on the one hand, creates the
dominant position of financial intermediaries; on the other hand, it makes it difficult
for financial risks to be spread in the whole society by means of market-oriented
methods. These concentrated risks bring heavy pressure on financial intermediaries
and further strengthen financial intermediaries’ conservative character in business
operation. In short, the dominant position of indirect financing and the imperfect risk
spreading mechanism result in the inadequate service of financial intermediaries to
private enterprises, especially SMEs, which lack implicit guarantee from the
4government.
2. Dominant Debt Financing and Backward Equity Financing
As shown in Table 1-1, according to the National Bureau of Statistics, the
increase of social financing in 2018 was 19259.8 billion yuan, of which: RMB loan
was 15,671 billion yuan, accounting for 81.37%; corporate bond financing was
2,485.3 billion yuan, accounting for 12.90%; stock financing of non-financial
enterprises was only 36.6 billion yuan, accounting for only 1.87%. From the nature
of financing instruments, debt financing is dominant, and the proportion of equity
financing is too low.
Table 1-1 Structure of China's Social Financing in 2008 -2018 (RMB 100 million)
year amount
Renminbi loan Enterprise bonds
Domestic Stocks of
Non-financial
Enterprises
amount share（%） amount share（%） amount share（%）
2018 192598 156710 81.37 24853 12.90 3606 1.87
2017 194445 138432 71.19 4421 2.27 8759 4.50
2016 178159 124372 69.81 30025 16.85 12416 6.97
2015 154063 112693 73.15 29388 19.08 7590 4.93
2014 158761 97452 61.38 24329 15.32 4350 2.74
2013 173169 88916 51.35 18111 10.46 2219 1.28
2012 157631 82038 52.04 22551 14.31 2508 1.59
2011 128286 74715 58.24 13658 10.65 4377 3.41
2010 140191 79451 56.67 11063 7.89 5786 4.13
2009 139104 95942 68.97 12367 8.89 3350 2.41
2008 69802 49041 70.26 5523 7.91 3324 4.76
Average 153292 99978 65.22 17844 11.64 5299 3.46
Source: National Bureau of Statistics
From the legal and financial point of view, the creditor's right is a put option,
and the lender (creditor) is the seller of the put option. Interest income constitutes the
creditor's limited return, while potential principal loss constitutes the risk it may
5encounter. The interest rate is only a small fraction of principal, so creditors are
facing a severe return-risk asymmetry. Considering the asymmetric characteristics of
creditor's rights with limited return and risk of nearly limitless potential loss, the
lender should first consider downside risks of the prospective project and strictly
follow the principles of soundness, safety and prudence. In general, the priority
clients for the lenders are enterprises with long operating history, large scale, stable
performance, good corporate governance, sufficient solvency and adequate collateral,
especially state-owned enterprises with implicit government guarantee. Private
SMEs are at a disadvantage in the above aspects, and naturally, they are not the
favorite clients for the lenders.
From the fact of China's financial development in recent years, credit
institutions represented by commercial banks naturally have the characteristics of
preferring to large enterprises, mature industries and state-owned enterprises with
implicit government guarantee. These organizations control China's financial
resources mainly, which aggravates the financing difficulties of private SMEs in
China. Especially in the period when the economy encounters external shocks or
disturbances, such as the decline of economic growth, uncertain economic prospects
or the background of de-leveraging, this feature is particularly pronounced.
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Figure 1-2 Distribution of Bank Loans in State-owned Enterprises and Private
Enterprises in 2015 - 2017
As shown in Figure 1-2, since the implementation of the supply-side structural
reform policy in 2016, the share of bank loans to state-owned enterprises has
increased sharply from 61.3% in 2015 to 83.8% in 2017. While the share of bank
loans to private enterprises has dropped rapidly from 38.7% in 2015 to 16.2% in
2017 which has dropped by more than half (-58.2%). This trend makes the private
enterprises facing financing difficulties undoubtedly worse. It also makes the
financing guarantee business of the FGC decline sharply and the quality of the
financing guarantee business decrease tremendously.
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Sampled Private enterprises’ Non-standard Financing Accounted for Their Total Financing in 2015-2017
Figure 1-3 Sampled Private enterprises’ Non-standard Financing Accounted for
Their Total Financing in 2015-2017
As shown in Figure 1-3, under the background of strict financial supervision,
non-standard financing relied on by private enterprises has also contracted sharply.
The proportion of non-standard financing to the total financing of sampled private
enterprises has decreased from 43.4% to 15.0%, while the increase in bank credit
cannot cancel out the decrease in non-standard financing, resulting in the decline of
the total financing scale of private enterprises. Inadequate traditional loans and
tightened non-standard financing make the financing problem of private enterprises
very noticeable.
3. Deficient Market-oriented Credit Risk Management Instruments
China's low proportion of direct financing seriously distresses the full
development of the financial market, and it cannot provide effective risk transferring
8instruments for financial institutions operating indirect financing, thus seriously
restrict the development of indirect financing.
Asset securitization started late and CDS developed slowly.
Asset securitization refers to the process of dividing and reorganizing the assets
expected to produce stable cash flow but with poor liquidity through a series of
structural arrangements, and transforming the expected cash flow of assets into more
competitive financial products with the help of credit enhancement. For banks and
other credit institutions, the main functions of asset securitization include:
revitalizing assets, alleviating mismatches between assets and liabilities; dispersing
risks and reducing credit risk concentration; increasing intermediary business income,
improving the return on assets of banks; enlarging business, strengthening and
consolidating customer relations. China's credit asset securitization sprouted in the
1990s. It was not until 2005 that the Central Bank and the Banking Regulatory
Commission officially promulgated the "Measures for the Pilot Management of
Credit Asset Securitization". The pilot work of credit asset securitization officially
opened, and a system of issuing and circulating of credit asset-backed securities
(ABS) in the interbank market was set up, with the central bank and the Banking
Regulatory Commission as the leading force. In 2017, 62 sponsors in the credit ABS
market successfully issued 133 single products with a total amount of 597.229
billion yuan. Banking financial institutions, as the main initiator, account for 75.91%
of the total amount issued. At present, the main problems of asset securitization in
China are simple structure, limited profit margin, difficult pricing and valuation,
9single investor structure, weak liquidity, etc.
In fact, as early as 2010, the China Traders Association issued the "Interbank
Market Credit Risk Mitigation Instruments Pilot Business Guidelines", outlining the
relevant framework of credit risk mitigation instruments, but the development of the
mitigation instruments in the exchange market is relatively slow. On September 23,
2016, in order to enrich the means of risk management for market participants and
improve the mechanism of credit risk transferring and sharing, the China Traders
Association issued the revised "Pilot Business Rules for Credit Risk Mitigation
Instruments in Interbank Markets". On October 22, 2018, the People's Bank of China
issued the "Establishment of Bond Financing Support Instruments for Private
Enterprises to Support the Development of Private Economy Unwavering". It
requires that the credit risk mitigating instruments and credit enhancement should
support private enterprises with market, prospect and competitive technology.
However, up to now, the trading volume and application scope are very limited.
Credit Insurance Develops Slowly and Needs to Be Improved Urgently.
On July 11, 2017, the CIRC promulgated the Interim Measures for the
Supervision of Credit Guarantee Insurance Business. In April of 2018, the credit
insurance market changed dramatically. Suddenly, insurance companies issuing
credit insurance policies informed clients that they could no longer issue insurance
policies for financing businesses. Foreign banks notified customers one after another
that the financing would be stopped because insurance could not be renewed. The
utilization of credit insurance by Chinese banks has been popular for several years,
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but in recent years, due to the internal management problems of banks and banks
liking to use simple means of risk controlling such as mortgage and guarantee, the
application scale of credit insurance has gradually declined. At the same time, due to
the narrow variety of credit insurance in China, product introduction and innovation
are practically absent, which cannot meet the diversified financing needs.
4.Behindhand Credit System and the High Credit Risk
The Development of Credit Reporting System Lags Behind.
Social credit system is a kind of social governance mechanism. It takes credit
laws and regulations as the basis of system, credit professional service institutions as
the main body, legal and effective credit information as the basis. It aims at reducing
the information asymmetry among market participants, encouraging the trustworthy,
making the dishonest pay the price, and ensuring the fairness and efficiency of
market economy. The purpose of social credit system is to establish a market soft
environment and efficient market rules suitable for the development of credit
transactions, and to ensure the smooth transition from market economy to credit
economy, that is, to replace the primary means of payment by credit transactions as
the main mode of market transactions. A perfect social credit system is the premise
for credit to play its role, the institutional assurance for the development of market
economy to an advanced stage, and the infrastructure for the development of credit
economy. The perfection of social credit system has become a remarkable symbol of
the maturity of market economy.
In 1999, China put forward the concept of social credit system as a fundamental
11
measure to rectify and standardize the market economic order. However, it was not
until 15 years later, that is, June 2014, that the first national top-level design
document, the Outline of Social Credit System Planning (2014-2020), was issued. In
recent years, great progress has taken place in the construction of China's social
credit system, which has attracted wide attention of the international communities.
However, the lack of social credit has not been fundamentally reversed, mainly
including: the lack of social integrity and credit transaction risks are still prominent,
the development of public credit mechanism and market credit mechanism is very
unbalanced, and the institutional mechanism of social credit system building is
facing challenges. Compared with developed countries, the main problems in the
construction of China's social credit system are: laws and regulations on credit
management need to be established urgently, the construction of social credit system
lacks overall planning, and the supply and demand of credit service market is
seriously insufficient.
Credit Risk Remains High.
Since the reform and opening up, under the impetus of industrialization and
urbanization, Chinese society has changed dramatically from a traditional
acquaintance society to a modern anonymous society. With the imperfection of
social credit system and legal system, there inevitably exist opportunists who betray
their faith in market transactions: as long as the cost of default is much lower than
the benefits, the existence of such opportunists is the result of rational game. This
kind of opportunistic transaction acts on the financing market, which significantly
12
increases the burden and cost of the creditors' screening, and aggravates the
financing difficulties of private SMEs. State-owned enterprises usually have implicit
guarantees from the government, and there are no serious financing constraints.
However, private SMEs have to pay for the high credit risk, so there are always
difficulties in SMEs financing.
ii Financing Difficulties of SMEs
1. Embodiment of Financing Difficulties
Private economy plays an important role in the whole economic system. It
contributes more than 50% of tax revenue, 60% of GDP, 70% of technological
innovation, 80% of urban employment, 90% of new employment and the number of
enterprises. Private enterprises are mainly SMEs. It is very difficult for private SMEs
to finance indirectly or directly.
Indirect financing of private SMEs is difficult. At present, indirect financing
is the main financing approach of Chinese enterprises. However, depositary financial
institutions are inherently reluctant to lend, which is difficult to meet the financing
needs of the whole society and seriously underserves private SMEs. Depositary
financial institutions are very special investors, whose funds mainly come from
deposit liabilities. Depositary financial institutions essentially absorb short-term
liabilities and then use them to grant loans with relatively long maturities through the
term mismatch. According to Article 7 of the Bankruptcy Law, if the debtor is unable
to pay the debts that are due, the creditor may propose to the court the bankruptcy
liquidation of the debtor. As deposit liabilities of depositary financial institutions are
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essentially matured debts, it can be said that they are born on the start line of
bankruptcy liquidation. This means that compared with other financial institutions or
investors, depositary financial institutions tend to be vigilant and conservative in
their investment behavior.
Because the amount of collateral is difficult to meet the bank's credit
requirements, and the lack of government "implicit guarantee", financing problems
of private SMEs are prominent. According to the sample survey data of the Chinese
Academy of Financial Sciences, from 2015 to 2017, the ratio of bank loans of
private enterprises to those of state-owned enterprises in the sampled enterprises
declined rapidly from 63% to only 15%. Credit resources incline obviously to
state-owned enterprises. At the same time, under the background of strict financial
supervision, non-standard financing relied on by private enterprises has contracted
sharply. The proportion of non-standard financing in the total financing of sampled
private enterprises has decreased from 43% to 15%, while the increase of bank credit
cannot offset the contraction of non-standard financing, which leads to the decline of
the total financing scale of private enterprises. Traditional loans are inadequate and
non-standard financing is tightened, which makes it difficult for private enterprises
to raise funds.
It is difficult for private SMEs to obtain direct financing. Financing by
issuing stocks and bonds is very demanding in China. According to the current
Company Law of China, Joint Stock Company can be listed to raise funds from the
whole society. However, the minimum registered capital for the establishment of a
14
joint stock company shall not be less than 10 million RMB. With such a high
threshold, most SMEs can only stand back. At present, China's capital market is
mainly inclined to large enterprises. The SME board, Growth Enterprise Market
(GEM) board and the new three boards are still in the early stage of development,
with small scale and narrow industry coverage, which are far from meeting the direct
financing needs of SMEs. Although the newly established joint venture board in
China provides a platform for direct financing for SMEs, the listed enterprises are a
small number of large-scale SMEs, and most SMEs are difficult to access to the fund
stock market. If SMEs have higher credit, they can obtain financing through
commercial paper. However, due to the late start and imperfection of China's credit
rating system, this financing channel is obviously not feasible.
According to the data of the 2012 World Bank questionnaire on Chinese
enterprises, compared with the surrounding countries, Chinese enterprises are facing
higher levels of credit constraints. Specifically, among the sources of funds needed
by Chinese enterprises, endogenous financing provides most of the funds for
enterprise investment, up to 90%, and bank loans provide only 5% of the total funds
needed for investment, compared with 70% and 15% in the Asia-Pacific region,
respectively. In addition, from the point of view of the availability of corporate loans,
only 25% of Chinese enterprises can obtain bank loans, which is far below the
average level in the Asia-Pacific region (40%). Among them, the ratio of the value of
collateral to the amount of bank loans provided by enterprises receiving bank
mortgages reaches 200%, which is much higher than the average collateral coverage
15
of 170% in the Asia-Pacific region. It can be said that over-reliance on endogenous
financing and lack of bank loan support have become serious obstacles to the
development of SMEs in the context of China's slowdown in economic growth and
supply-side structural reform.
2. Reasons for Financing Difficulties of SMEs
The financing problem of SMEs has always been the focus of policy makers
and researchers. The economic importance of the SMEs sector has been widely
recognized in academic and policy literature. They acknowledge that SMEs are
under-served, especially in the financial sector. The difficulty and high cost of
financing for SMEs is a worldwide problem. As early as early as 1931, the McMillan
Commission Report insisted that relatively small capital investment is riskier and
more expensive for the lenders, which makes the conditions for SMEs to seek loans
extremely unfavorable. Banks are unwilling to grant loans on the terms proposed by
SMEs, so that in the process of SMEs development, the total amount of money
invested is riskier and more expensive. There is a financing gap, i.e. the Macmillan
gap.
In addition to the deficiencies that the enterprises themselves cannot eradicate,
the factors that cause the financing difficulties of Chinese private SMEs are also
related to the imperfection of the external environment and financing policy of the
enterprises.
(a) Changes in the external environment are not conducive to the development
of SMEs. In recent years, the basic wages of on-the-job workers have been
16
increasing year by year. Prices have risen, consumption expenditure has increased,
and labor costs of SMEs have risen sharply. On the contrary, the profit margin of
SMEs is decreasing year by year, and the survival risk of SMEs is increasing. At the
same time, banks are facing such huge financial pressure, SMEs financing is worse.
These difficulties include a substantial increase in overall costs and a huge shortfall
in operating capital. At the same time, some industries are experiencing a decline in
profits and even losses.
(b) The credit information system is not yet all encompassing. China's credit
information system started late, and the People's Bank of China and commercial
banks have not jointly established credit files for SMEs. It is difficult for the credit
information system to provide sufficient credit information support for commercial
banks to grant loans to SMEs. Commercial banks rely too much on mortgage
guarantees for loans to SMEs.
(c) The return-risk of SMEs loans is asymmetric. With small business scale,
small assets, weak brand effect, lack of market stability, weak competitiveness and
ability to withstand external shocks, SMEs are easy to bring greater risks to investors.
With the establishment of strict credit risk management accountability system in
banks, it will obviously increase the difficulty of SME loans.
(d) The assets that SMEs can use for mortgage loans are inadequate. For the
sake of risk factors, bank loans to SMEs are mainly guaranteed or mortgage loans.
However, the size of SMEs is not large. They have neither fixed assets to be
mortgaged nor negotiable securities. Some of them even rely on leasing equipment
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and factory buildings. It is difficult to meet the preconditions that the borrower must
have certain capital strength.
(e) The financial system of SMEs is not perfect, and the authenticity of
financial information is difficult to verify. A considerable number of SMEs have not
standardized financial systems and sound accounting departments. There are many
doubts about the authenticity of financial statements provided by SMEs. Financial
institutions can get little valuable operational and financial information of SMEs.
Consequently, in order to control risks, banks are unwilling to grant loans to
SMEs.
II. Financing Guarantee as Credit Risk Transfer Instrument
1. Regulatory Requirements on Credit Risk of Basel Accord
Various versions of the Basel Accord require banks to bear credit risk with a
corresponding proportion of capital, which constitutes a regulatory constraint on the
amount of credit risk that banks bear under certain capital conditions. The Basel
Accord I of July 1988 regards the capital adequacy ratio as the core of the regulatory
framework to assess the bank's coverage and resistance to credit risk. The main
contents include: concretizing the calculation of capital adequacy ratio, dividing the
capital into core capital and subsidiary capital, and unifying the standard of capital
composition; dividing the risky assets into the risky assets in the statement and the
risky assets outside the statement, and stipulating different credit conversion
coefficients for the off-balance sheet business, and classifying the inside and outside
of the statement according to the asset classification. The risk weight is divided into
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five categories, and the minimum capital adequacy ratio is proposed, in which the
core capital adequacy ratio is not less than 4%, and the capital adequacy ratio is not
less than 8%.
In June 2004, the Basel II Accord for the first time established three pillars of
the international banking regulatory framework. On the basis of strengthening the
minimum capital regulatory requirements, the second and third pillars based on
supervision, inspection and market discipline were proposed. To expand the
coverage of risk measurement, a banking risk system covering credit risk,
operational risk and market risk was established for the first time. At the same time,
counterparty credit risk, asset securitization credit risk and risk mitigation were
included in bank risk measurement. Introducing internal model measurement for the
first time allows banks with high risk management level to construct internal model
to calculate capital through historical data.
In December 2010, Basel III focused on improving the "minimum capital
requirements" of the first pillar. On the one hand, the requirements for capital quality
and quantity have been further improved, including restoring the leading role of core
capital, improving the criteria for identifying capital instruments, and stringent
capital deduction projects; on the other hand, the scope of risk coverage has been
expanded, and the minimum capital requirements for asset securitization and
counterparty credit risk have been raised. At the same time, a broader level of
macro-prudential capital has been achieved, including increasing the reserve capital
requirement of no less than 2.5% consisting of common equity interests; establishing
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counter-cyclical capital of 0-2.5% associated with excessive credit growth; and
putting forward additional capital requirement of 1% for systemically important
banks.
2. Financing Guarantee as a Credit Risk Transfer Instrument
Credit risk transfer (CRT) refers to financial institutions, generally commercial
banks using various financial instruments to transfer credit risk to other banks or
other financial institutions. At present, the participants in the credit risk transfer
market are mainly various financial institutions, including: commercial banks,
institutional investors and securities companies. Those who transfer credit risk are
called credit risk transferors, and those who accept credit risk are called the recipient
of credit risk.
CRT can be divided into financing CRT and non-financing CRT. Financing CRT
refers to the transfer of credit risk to financial markets or financial institutions, while
achieving the financing of funds, including loan sales, asset securitization and so on.
The means of CRT separated from financing are credit guarantee, credit insurance
and credit derivatives (CD). Credit guarantee is a flexible tool for credit risk transfer.
Through bilateral contracts, the guarantor, as the undertaker of credit risk, assumes
the corresponding obligation of compensation or payment on behalf of the third
party (debtor) when it fails to fulfill its obligations. The amount is limited to the loss
exposed to potential risks. Credit insurance refers to the insurance contract signed by
an enterprise and an insurance institution to pay a certain premium so as to obtain
compensation for losses incurred within the specified credit risk range. Credit
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derivatives refer to a bilateral financial contractual arrangement in which both parties
agree to swap the pre-agreed or formula-based cash flow, which depends on the
pre-determined occurrence of credit events in the future. Credit events are usually
associated with default, bankruptcy registration, credit rating decline or price decline
considerably.
III. Financing Guarantee System in Urgent Need of Perfection
1. The Position of SMEs in the Economic System
SMEs are often seen as the backbone of the economy. Their significant
contributions to economic growth, employment creation, social cohesion, poverty
alleviation and local and regional development have won wide consensus. In China,
according to official statistics in 2015, SMEs contributed more than 65% of GDP,
more than 50% of tax revenue, more than 68% of exports and more than 75% of
employment in 2014. According to Yi Gang, governor of the Central Bank, by the
end of 2017, there were 28 million small and micro enterprises as legal persons,
more than 65 million individual businesses, accounting for more than 90% of the
total market participants; small and micro enterprises contributed more than 60% of
GDP, more than 50% of tax revenue and 80% of employment posts; small and micro
enterprises completed 65% of invention patents and 80% of employment posts. The
above new product development is an important carrier of mass entrepreneurship and
innovation.
2. Quasi-public Nature of Financing Guarantee for SMEs
The important role of SMEs in economic development and their financial
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weakness characteristics determine that the development of SMEs must rely on
government policy support. To this end, countries around the world generally adopt
active fiscal and taxation support policies to promote the growth and development of
SMEs. Practice in various countries has proved that because SMEs have the
characteristics of large quantity, small scale, wide distribution and many kinds, only
using financial support cannot avoid the problems of low efficiency, small coverage
and poor fairness. The introduction of SMEs financing guarantee can effectively
improve the efficiency and fairness of government support. At the same time,
through the establishment of a guarantee group, the government can increase the
support to the guaranteed, and use the leverage effect of guarantee to guide more
SMEs and funds into the areas encouraged by the national industrial policy. From the
practical effect, the government's intention to establish and develop SMEs financing
guarantee is mainly to alleviate the financing difficulties of SMEs, at the same time
to help achieve other macro-policy objectives, such as industrial policy guidance,
supporting SMEs technological upgrading, and promoting the rapid development of
high-tech enterprises. This reflects the quasi-public nature of SMEs financing
guarantee. If it is fully commercialized, it will inevitably lead to insufficient supply.
Over the past 100 years, the development history of foreign guarantee industry
and the actual operation mode of guarantee business in various countries have
clearly shown that the financing guarantee business of SMEs has the characteristics
of high risk and low return. It must rely on government financial funds. It belongs to
the government's behavior to achieve specific policy objectives, and it is difficult to
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universally implement profit-making business model.
3. Development status of SMEs financing guarantee system
The development of China's financing guarantee industry began in 1993. With
the rapid development of the national economy, the financing guarantee industry has
developed rapidly. By the end of 2014, when the momentum of the development of
financing guarantee companies was at its peak, there were 7898 financing guarantee
companies in China, with a guarantee balance of 2.74 trillion yuan, including 2.34
trillion yuan in the guarantee balance, 1.28 trillion yuan in the guarantee loan
balance of SMEs financing, and 2514,000 small and medium-sized customers. The
industry's paid-in capital is 925.5 billion yuan, of which 75 institutions have
registered capital of more than 1 billion yuan, with an average registered capital of
117 million yuan. Since 2015, the growth rate of the number of financing guarantee
companies has decreased by an average of 5% annually, and the growth rate of the
scale of financing guarantee business has also slowed down.
The relevant policies on SMEs financing guarantee have been issued in
succession throughout the country, which makes the financing guarantee industry
standardized and provides practical guarantee for its stable development. At present,
the CBRC and relevant departments have continuously strengthened the reform of
the financing guarantee industry. The State Council has also issued a series of
guidance on the development of financing guarantee companies. The financing
guarantee industry is developing towards a scientific and effective model. However,
there are still many problems in financing guarantee for SMEs, and it is necessary to
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constantly improve the financing guarantee system.
1.2 Significance and Potential Innovation of Selection of Topics
I. Significance of Selecting Topics
At present, financing difficulty is still one of the basic problems that perplex the
development of SMEs in China. The government and industry are also trying to
alleviate or solve this problem through various institutional mechanism innovations.
For example, to solve the difficulties of SMEs by increasing the credit of financing
guarantee companies, but its institutional mechanism is still in the exploratory stage
and needs to be further improved. The company I lead (China Success Finance
Group Holding Co., Ltd.) has also been engaged in financing guarantee services for
SMEs for a long time, and has accumulated rich first-hand materials and business
experience. Based on the business cases of FGC, focusing on the zero-loss-principle
of financing guarantee business operation under the mode of profit-making business
in China, this paper tries to summarize the credit enhancement of financing
guarantee company from three aspects: entrepreneur factor, market factor and
technology factor inherent in the borrowing enterprise. It is expected that the
conclusions of this study will be helpful to guide FCGs to carry out financing
guarantee services more effectively, and to add new research perspectives and
empirical conclusions to the theory of SMEs credit enhancement.
II. Potential Innovation Points
At present, China's financing guarantee system has not yet been unified as
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quasi-public nature and the national support system has not yet been established.
Under the condition that the FCG operates the financing guarantee business
according to the principle of commercial operation, it should not only conform to the
changes of the economic and social development situation, but also properly deal
with the asymmetry of return-risk in financing guarantee business. FCGs must
implement the zero-loss-principle in their business operations, and they must select
their clients very harshly and carefully. This selection rule for financing guarantee
customers is the basis of FCG's business operation, which is worthy of in-depth
study. Following the logical thinking of enterprise fundamentals analysis, starting
from the essential source of credit risk and taking the guaranteed enterprise as the
analysis object, this paper incorporates the characteristics of entrepreneurs, the
market competitiveness and the technological suitability of enterprises into the
framework of credit enhancement model, and tries to simplify the traditional credit
analysis methods as far as possible on the basis of refining the essential elements of
credit enhancement of FGCs.
Summary
Financing difficulties of SMEs are a worldwide problem, which is more serious
in China. This chapter first analyses the characteristics of China's financial system:
indirect financing is dominant, direct financing is weak; debt financing is dominant,
equity financing lags behind; market-oriented credit risk management instruments
are scarce; credit reporting system lags behind, and credit risk is high. This is the
basic financial environment for China’s FGCs to carry out credit enhancement
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business. Then it introduces the main manifestations of SMEs financing difficulties,
and preliminarily analyses the internal and external causes of SMEs' financing
difficulties. Then, from the perspective of credit risk transfer instruments, the paper
examines the financing guarantee system of SMEs in China, which needs to be
improved urgently. Finally, the significance and potential innovations of the topic are
introduced. According to the first-hand documents of the company's long-term
financing guarantee business, this paper tries to summarize the credit enhancement
model of FGC from three aspects: entrepreneurs, market and technology factors
inherent in the borrowing enterprise.
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Chapter II Literature Review
The credit enhancement business of FGC mainly serves for the financing of
SMEs. In nature, it is a credit enhancement instrument, which belongs to credit risk
management in theory and technology. The following is a review of the main
literature on SMEs financing, credit enhancement and credit risk management.
1.1 Literature Review of SMEs Financing
I. Foreign Literature on Financing of SMEs
i. Credit Rationing and Relational Financing
1. Bank Credit Rationing
Credit rationing theory of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) explains that SMEs are
more difficult to obtain credit support. Information asymmetry in credit market will
inevitably lead to adverse selection and moral hazard, which will make banks face
higher credit risk. In order to reduce credit risk, banks will lower the interest rate
below the equilibrium interest rate level to encourage enterprises with high
creditworthiness to borrow, and limit those enterprises with low creditworthiness to
borrow. For various reasons, SMEs often have low creditworthiness and are difficult
to obtain loans from banks. This theory provides a good idea for the analysis of
financing obstacles of SMEs from another angle, that is, from the perspective of
information economics. It is generally believed that the characteristics of small
enterprises determine that bank credit is one of the important sources of financing in
its development process. Therefore, the discussion on credit rationing of small
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enterprises is also an important branch of financing theory of SMEs.
Equilibrium credit rationing refers to the phenomenon that the credit market
cannot be cleared under general interest rate conditions, not because of the monetary
authority's control over the interest rate ceiling, but because of the bank's profit
maximization motive. There are many theoretical explanations about the generation
mechanism of credit rationing, among which Stiglitz et al. (1981) have the most
influence on the theoretical model based on information asymmetry in credit market.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 1986, 1992 ) point out in the classical literature on credit
rationing that adverse selection and moral hazard caused by information asymmetry
are the basic reasons for balanced credit rationing. When facing the excess demand
for loans, in order to avoid adverse selection, banks will not raise interest rates to
clear the market, but allocate loan applicants at a level lower than the competitive
equilibrium interest rate.
Whette (1983) extends Stiglitz's theory, pointing out that the collateral
requirement of banks may also become an endogenous mechanism of credit
rationing under the condition of borrower's risk neutrality. Bester (1987) further
discusses the role of collateral in credit rationing. He believes that collateral and
interest rate can be used as the screening mechanism for banks to separate the risk
types of loan projects, that is, banks can separate high-risk and low-risk loan projects
through the sensitivity of enterprises to the changes in the number of collateral.
Williamson (1986) discusses the supervisory cost in the process of credit rationing.
He also attributed the non-monotonic change between bank expected returns and
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interest rates to information asymmetry.
2. Relationship Lending
Credit rationing is an endogenous mechanism of credit market. However,
theoretical research and empirical evidence show that the rejected in credit rationing
are mainly SMEs. The main problem of SMEs credit is that the information of SMEs
is seriously opaque. Unlike standard contracts provided by banks, SMEs credit is
more carried out through relationship loans. As an important means to solve the
financing problem of SMEs, relational loan has attracted extensive attention of
foreign sectors and scholars. The decision-making of such bank loans is mainly
based on the accumulated information about borrowing enterprises and entrepreneurs
through long-term and multi-channel contacts. Under the relational loan, the bank's
information accumulation can be acquired not only incidentally through the deposit,
settlement and consulting business of the enterprise, but also from the stakeholders
of the enterprise and the community where the enterprise is located. The "soft
information" which is difficult to quantify and transmit on the basis of relational loan
partly makes up for the credit gap caused by SMEs inability to provide qualified
financial information and collateral, and helps to increase their unfavorable credit
conditions. Empirical research shows that the strengthening of long-term cooperation
between banks and enterprises is conducive to reducing the loan interest rate of
SMEs, reducing the loan guarantee and mortgage requirements, reducing the
dependence on commercial credit, and mitigating the impact of interest rate
fluctuations on the loan interest rate of SMEs.
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Boot and Greenbaum (1993) argue that when small businesses cannot obtain
formal loan commitments from banks or unconditional loan contracts, they will seek
alternatives. One way is to resort to market mechanisms, by purchasing long-term
implicit contracts with commissions, firms and banks can build closer relationships.
With the expansion of the length and scope of the relationship, banks can better
supervise enterprises. Nakamura (1993) emphasizes that the comparative advantage
of banks in information production is particularly strong for small, relatively
unknown enterprises that rely on a bank to provide services, so banks are willing to
maintain credit relations with the original enterprises. The relationship theory
generally agrees that the benefits of relationship-based credit are multifaceted,
including increasing the supply of credit, but there are differences on whether it will
reduce the cost of credit. Boot and Thakor (1994) show that for the best credit
contract, borrowers initially pay a higher interest rate than the market and provide
collateral. When a project succeeds, the interest rate for unsecured loans is lower
than the market rate. Many scholars believe that a stronger "relationship" can enable
small businesses to obtain lower lending rates (Berger and Udell, 1995).
As for the comparative advantage of banks in information production, Petersen
and Rajan (1994, 1995) believe that banks can solve the problems of adverse
selection and moral hazard, thus reducing interest rates. However, in a centralized
credit market, the bank capture effect has little possibility of reducing interest rates.
Others believe that firms may get worse credit conditions from their lending banks in
the future. Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) argue that the problem of information
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possession allows banks to monopolize the market. Lenders gain information
monopoly after the event. If successful enterprises want to find new banks, they may
have to pay conversion costs.
In fact, high-quality borrowers are not necessarily mobile, and they are captured
by information. Santomero (1982) argues that banks are allowed to extract additional
rents from businesses because they have a cost burden in finding loans. However,
Greenbaum (1989) emphasizes that when firms can afford such search costs,
competitive banks will capture firms at low initial interest rates, so borrowing rates
will not increase over time. Grace O. Kim (2001) argues that small businesses are
willing to pay higher interest rates as credit commissions in the initial stage to ensure
better credit conditions in the future. According to the relational investment model,
unless small businesses default in the first phase, they will not get worse loan
conditions in the second phase regardless of the number of lending institutions. In
addition, in the aspect of cost-benefit analysis, the return on investment of small
enterprises in relation is negative in the initial stage. After a certain period of time,
small businesses may also gain the monopoly position of buyers in the credit market,
because they can choose to suspend or not suspend the credit relationship, invest or
not invest in the credit relationship of other banks. This may be because small
businesses evolve in the financing life cycle and build creditworthiness without
being captured by banks. However, since small businesses are already investing in
their relationships with banks, there is no need for them to give up financing from
them. This model not only explains the value of "relationship" to small enterprises,
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but also explains the development of "relationship" itself when small enterprises
develop.
ii. Structural Response Theory
1. Credit Policy Shocks.
There are two channels of credit shock: bank loan channel and balance sheet
channel. The bank loan channel refers to the reduction of bank reserve accompanied
by monetary tightening, which leads to the decrease of loan supply. In this case,
enterprises tend to reduce their real expenditure level due to the lack of alternative
sources of funds. This means that monetary policy may have a greater impact on
firms that rely on bank loans while lacking alternative sources of capital, and small
businesses tend to have these characteristics. The balance sheet channel means that
monetary tightening impairs the value of corporate collateral by raising interest rates,
reduces the credit rating of enterprises, and thus weakens the ability of enterprises to
obtain loans. From this point of view, it can be concluded that small businesses are
more impacted by the adjustment of monetary policy, because mortgage loan plays a
more important role in financing of small enterprises than large enterprises. Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994) show that small manufacturing enterprises are not only directly
sensitive to interest rates, but also indirectly affected by the economic cycle.
Therefore, the impact of monetary tightening on small enterprises is greater than that
on large enterprises.
2. Scale Matching Theory
According to the theory of scale matching, there is a strong negative correlation
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between bank loans to SMEs and bank size. Through the empirical analysis of banks
with different scales, Strahan and Weston (1998) find that there is an inverted
U-shaped non-monotonic function relationship between bank M&A scale and SMEs
loan ratio. The ratio of loan to SMEs increases first and then decreases with the asset
scale of bank M& A. Peek and Rosongren (1997) argue that mergers between big
banks and small banks or between big banks tend to reduce lending to SMEs.
Banerjee et al.(2014) discuss the information advantages of small and
medium-sized financial institutions in providing financial services for SMEs. They
put forward two hypotheses: one is the long-term interaction hypothesis. The
hypothesis holds that small and medium-sized financial institutions are generally
local, specially serving local SMEs. Through long-term cooperation, the
understanding of local SMEs is gradually increasing. Another hypothesis is the
co-supervision hypothesis. This hypothesis is especially suitable for cooperative
small and medium-sized financial institutions. Even if small and medium-sized
financial institutions cannot really understand the operation of SMEs, for the
common interests, SMEs in cooperative organizations will implement
self-supervision, which is even more than the supervision of financial institutions.
The enlightenment of this theory is that it is a feasible choice to develop small and
medium-sized financial institutions to meet the financing needs of SMEs.
3. Growth Cycle Theory
Berger et al. (2003) put forward the theory of enterprise financial growth cycle
by combining enterprise life cycle with financing. They believe that there is a
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financial growth cycle in the course of enterprise development. With the
development of enterprises, the accumulation of business records and performance,
and the improvement of information transparency, the financing needs and financing
options of enterprises will also change. Michaelas et al. (1998) believe that
enterprises used debt financing more in the period of establishment and growth, and
their dependence on debt financing would gradually decrease when enterprises
gradually matured. Berger and Udell (1998) point out that small, young and opaque
enterprise depend on initial internal financing, trade credit or angel financing;
indirect financing can be obtained when enterprises develop gradually; and finally, if
enterprises continue to grow, they have the opportunity to finance through the public
equity and debt markets. Berger and Udell (1998) point out that the growth cycle
theory mentioned above is only a general description of the financing path of
enterprises. It does not apply to all small enterprises, because the size, age and
information opacity of enterprises are not completely related.
The empirical test results also show the difference with this theoretical
expectation. Fluck et al. (1997) find that the external financing (mainly debt
financing) of Wisconsin enterprises in the initial stage exceeded the internal
financing. From 7 to 8 years before the development of enterprises, the proportion of
external financing in the total financing gradually declined, after the proportion of
external financing gradually declined the proportion tends to rise again. This reflects
that with the passage of time, the use of external capital by enterprises is not simply
from a minimum to a maximum, but presents a "U" shaped development trend. The
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combination of the two theories reflects that in the early stage of enterprise
development, internal funds are always used first, while external funds are used only
when internal funds are insufficient and conditions permit. Even in the initial stage,
there are external financing channels to choose. Enterprises often choose debt
financing firstly, and equity financing secondly. In equity financing, angel financing
or venture capital is the first step. It is possible and reasonable to raise funds through
the open equity market only when the enterprise develops to a considerable extent.
II. Domestic Literature on Financing of SMEs
i.Reasons for the Financing Difficulties of SMEs
1. Defects of Financial System Theory
Lin Yifu (2000) focuses on solving the financing problems of SMEs at the
institutional levels. He believes that we should vigorously develop SMEs, reform
state-owned enterprises, reform state-owned banks, open the market of
non-state-owned SMEs, and establish financing institutions especially for SMEs;
strengthen the function of market supervision, and strive to solve the financing
difficulties of SMEs in essence. Lin Yifu (2014) believes that the current financial
system cannot fully meet the financing needs of SMEs. Farmers, SMEs, although the
proportion of the employed population is as high as 70%, and the proportion of gross
domestic product is more than 60%, the financial services provided to them are still
scarce.
Wu Jinglian (2012) believes that the financing difficulties of SMEs are directly
or indirectly related to the discriminatory economic policies to a certain extent. In
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the planned economy era, there is little possibility for SMEs to survive. Since the
1980s, individual households business, private enterprises have emerged. The initial
stage of private enterprises is SMEs. These enterprises have been facing a
disadvantageous market environment for a long time. Only by eliminating
discriminatory standards, improving the financing environment, lowering the access
threshold of the financial industry, allowing and supporting the establishment and
development of various types of private small financial institutions, and matching
SMEs with small and medium-sized financial institutions, can the problem of
financing be alleviated.。
Xu Honghong (2001) believes that the financial gap is fundamentally caused by
the financial depression in China. Real interest rates do not reflect the real supply
and demand of funds, resulting in the coexistence of excessive demand for funds and
insufficient effective supply, resulting in a financial gap. At the same time, because
of the asymmetric information between banks and enterprises, the effective supply of
funds is reduced and the financial gap is aggravated. Yu Xuehua and Luan Jingzong
(2005) argue that China's credit rationing is not a single credit rationing subject to
market constraints, but also one subject to the inertia of the traditional planned
economic system, namely the so-called "double credit rationing". Under this
condition, the financing difficulties of SMEs mainly lie in three aspects: information
asymmetry, excessive government involvement and endogenous financing
constraints of SMEs.
Zhang Jie (1998, 2000) believes that the financing difficulties of SMEs stem
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from the financial support of the state-owned financial system for large state-owned
enterprises, the rigid dependence of state-owned enterprises on such support and the
resulting credit capitalization. Therefore, the financing problem of SMEs is
fundamentally a credit dilemma caused by the financing system. Liu Xiuli et al.
(2006) believe that state-owned commercial banks occupy an absolute position in the
national financial system. If private enterprises cannot get its support, it will be
difficult to solve the problem of financing, the credit policy of state-owned
commercial banks and should be adjusted and a certain proportion of funds should
be allocated to SMEs
2. Theory of Enterprise Defects
Li Yang and Yang Siqun (2001) believe that the financing difficulties of SMEs
are due to their high failure rate and closure rate, low credit rating, poor asset
condition, lack of effective guarantee or collateral for loans, and insufficient
creditworthiness for their own assets. Yang Qianyuan et al. (2000) and Li Changyou
(2004) think that the basic reason for financing difficulties is the quality of Chinese
SMEs themselves - the financial system is not perfect, which leads to their low credit.
When the operation is difficult, most SMEs try to prolong the interest on loans,
which poses a great threat to the security of credit funds of financial institutions and
aggravates the difficulty of SMEs loan. Yang Junlong and Yang Jun (2003) believe
that the main causes of financing difficulties are unclear property rights structure,
credit barriers and risk variables of SMEs. SMEs should start from improving their
own creditworthiness to solve the financing difficulties. Hu Naiwu et al. (2006) point
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out that SMEs have a lower reputation than large enterprises, their management style
and behavioral characteristics are highly uncertain, and the moral hazard of lending
to SMEs is relatively more serious.
3. Theory of Market Matching Failure
Hu Naiwu et al. (2006) emphasize that in the face of the financing demand of
SMEs characterized by of privatization, diversification and serious information
blockage, financial intermediaries with scale advantage in lending have failed, so it
may be contrary to economic theory and not sustainable forcing large commercial
banks to grant loans to SMEs. Zhang Qinggeng et al. (2006) point out that the lack
of experience in credit analysis of SMEs and the poor ability of risk management of
banks are also one of the reasons for financing difficulties of SMEs. Chen Jian (2006)
summarizes the practical experience of Korean Bank in developing SMEs credit
business, points out that the biggest problem faced by Chinese commercial banks is
the lack of basic data. The data model of commercial banks is mainly based on
account center, not customer center. This makes it possible for Chinese commercial
banks to establish their own data model based on account center rather than customer
center. Commercial banks cannot fully understand the overall situation of enterprises,
and the weak risk management foundation of SMEs makes it difficult to control
risks.
Liu Juntao (2004) argues that the structure of China's financial market is
unbalanced, the long-term lending and property rights markets of banks are
underdeveloped, while the debt security and stock markets are much more developed;
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there are also imbalances in the capital market, where debt security issuance is
relatively large while stock issuance is relatively small, while the opposite is true in
the trading market; and it is the imbalance in the debt security market itself, that is,
the bond market is relatively developed, while the corporate bond market are
relatively lagging behind. Yang Fenglai et al. (2006) point out that the lack of
financial innovation makes the financial system lack of new financial products to
support SMEs. Chen Hanwen (2006) points out that the lack of capital market
hierarchy, second board market and over-the-counter market, as well as strict market
access rules and lack of a variety of trading instruments in capital market make
SMEs unable to use capital market to raise funds in their own way.
ii.Solutions to the Financing Problem of SMEs
1. Improving the Loanability of SMEs
Ye Qian et al. (2003) examine the specific content of the expansion of
Hodgmann model of default risk through model analysis, including four types of
credit rationing and eliminating ideas, and believe that credit rationing existed
objectively for a long time and credit risk classification for enterprises was an
effective incentive mechanism. The guarantee effect should be exerted by
establishing a borrower alliance and a supervision alliance. Tang Luyuan (2003)
analyzes the significance of introducing external institutional constraints to change
the game equilibrium from the perspective of bank-enterprise game, and put forward
some countermeasures, such as establishing a credit legal system, punishing
enterprise's dishonesty and establishing enterprise's credit information system. Tang
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Ping (2006) believes that credit intermediaries should give full play to the role of
credit supervision of SMEs. Credit intermediaries providing credit guarantee for
SMEs should regularly or irregularly inspect and supervise the credit and finance of
SMEs in order to prevent the irregularities in the operation of SMEs. Li Dan (2006)
believes that SMEs should not only establish a standardized property rights system
and credit system, but also establish a standardized financial system, improve the
level of financial management, and enhance the authenticity and transparency of
financial information. At the same time, the enterprise financial agency system has
been proved to be an effective measure in market economy countries, and China
should gradually implement it.
2. Perfecting the Financing Guarantee System
Lin Yifu et al. (2001) based on the function and effective allocation of the
financial system, believe that the premise of SMEs financing is to establish national
credit system, credit investigation institutions, guarantee system, government and
market mechanism. Duan Weiping et al.(2003) through game analysis, propose that
the solution to non-cooperation between banks and enterprises is to develop credit
guarantee and small and medium-sized financial institutions. Ou Xinqian (2004)
believes that, with the necessary policy support, it is unavoidable to focus on
supporting a number of guaranty institutions with outstanding business performance
and sound management system to speed up the establishment of SMEs credit
re-guarantee institutions. Zhang Qinggeng et al. (2006) believe that state-owned
commercial banks should gradually formulate and improve their internal "Credit
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Grade Evaluation Measures of Credit Guarantee Institutions", promote the
development of guarantee business of FGCs, and promote the smooth financing
channels of SMEs. To solve the problem of information asymmetry, the development
of credit guarantee institutions can effectively reduce the problem of information
asymmetry. Jin Lihong et al. (2006) believe that the re-guarantee system should be
established. While undertaking the responsibility of guarantee, the guarantee
institutions should reinsurance the risks already assumed in accordance with a
certain proportion, and then the insurance institutions should take part of the risks. In
this way, insurance companies can update products, and guarantee agencies can
relieve worries and avoid risks.
2.1 Literature Review of Credit Enhancement
According to the Business Standards for Credit Enhancing Institutions and Risk
Management Standards for Credit Enhancing Institutions issued by the People's
Bank of China in 2001, credit enhancement refers to the effective forms that are
clearly defined in the documents of guarantee, credit derivatives, structured financial
products or other effective forms defined in laws, regulations, policies and industry
self-regulatory documents that can improve the credit rating of debts and enhance
the level of debt performance guarantee, thereby dispersing and transferring credit
risks to professional financial services. The way to achieve credit enhancement is to
design the product structure and specific agreement arrangements, or use various
effective means and financial instruments to ensure that debtors pay the principal
and interest of corporate bonds on time, so as to make corporate bonds have higher
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credit rating, increase the probability of successful bond issuance, and reduce the
cost of bond issuance.
According to the principle of credit enhancement, the ways of credit
enhancement can be divided into basic credit enhancement, derivatives credit
enhancement and structured credit enhancement. Among them: basic credit
enhancement, including guarantee and pledge, has been widely used in various types
of corporate bonds, mainly for improving the credit rating of bonds before issuance;
credit derivatives credit enhancement includes credit default swaps, credit risk
mitigation instruments, mainly for short-term financing bills, medium-term bills and
other bonds. By purchasing credit derivatives, securities investors can transfer their
credit risks and slow down their capital regulatory constraints. Structured credit
enhancement includes senior-junior structure, which is mainly used for investors
with different risk preferences to share bond risks through bond stratification and
increase structured credit. Structured credit enhancement is generally used in
conjunction with other credit enhancement methods.
I. Foreign Credit Enhancement Literature
Steven (2002) believes that credit enhancement is a unique technological
approach. When credit rating is insufficient, the initiator sacrifices part of the capital
cost to purchase additional credit support from the other party. John, Lynch and Puri
(2003) believe that there is a strong negative correlation between bond spreads and
credit rating, and that higher-level bonds have smaller spreads, so credit
enhancement can effectively reduce financing costs. Ambuose (2001) believes that
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there are many aspects of risk in the process of asset securitization issuance, and
credit enhancement can effectively increase the confidence of investors, which is a
practical strategy. This slight concession to income can promote the project to
produce cash flow redistribution and achieve a small and broad effect. Van Son Lai
and Issouf Soumare (2010) establish contingent claim analysis models for
continuous time to analyze the impact of credit insurance on investment, and find
that under the premise of maximizing the interests of investors, the existence of
credit insurance has greatly increased the attractiveness of investment, and there is a
relationship between investment duration and investment scale. Acharya (2002)
analyzes all aspects of the credit enhancement mode and finds that there is the most
suitable design in each specific situation, but each design has its advantages and
disadvantages, and the combination of internal and external upgrading is a
reasonable solution.
II. Domestic Credit Enhancement Literature
Xue Shirong (2009) points out that credit enhancement technology can
effectively reduce the financing costs of securities issuers and improve the credit
rating of assets, thereby increasing the liquidity of assets in the economy, improving
the flow of funds and turnover speed. Peng Jiangbo and Geng Xin (2011) believe
that credit enhancement improves the allocation efficiency of funds and the
financing efficiency of financial markets by reducing the credit risk and financing
cost of SMEs. Liao Xiaoyun (2007) compares the effects of various credit
derivatives, believing that credit derivatives have the characteristics of
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off-balance-sheet management instruments, and the effectiveness of their correction
results has been recognized by the banking industry. The application of credit
derivatives can simplify legal procedures, save transaction costs, and effectively and
reasonably adjust the capital adequacy ratio and risk weight of banks and expand the
scope of credit risk protection. Zhang Xuetao and Hu Wei (2012) use the method of
combining theory with demonstration to explore and study the effect of credit
derivative instrument-credit risk mitigation instrument in the credit risk mitigation of
commercial banks. They believe that the use of credit risk mitigation instrument
could increase the target loan amount by about 63% while maintaining the
risk-weighted assets unchanged. At the same time, the use of credit risk mitigation
instruments will generate excessive investment demand, and ultimately increase the
target loan amount by about 74%.
2.3 Review of Credit Risk Management Literature
Credit risk refers to the risk that the borrower defaults and fails to fulfill his
obligation to pay debts. This may happen when the other party fails to pay or fails to
pay on time. As far as the essence of banking activities is concerned, credit risk is the
most obvious risk of banks. As far as potential losses are concerned, this is usually
the biggest category of risk for banks. The default of a few customers may cause
great losses to banks. McKinsey, a well-known consulting firm, has studied the
actual allocation of risk capital in international banking industry and finds that credit
risk accounts for 60% of the total risk exposure of banks, while market risk and
operational risk only account for 20%. According to the definition of Basel II, credit
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risk is a function of the probability distribution of expected results of bank loans and
risk exposure and it can be decomposed into three elements: default probability,
default exposure and specific default loss rate. According to the Criteria for Credit
Rating in Credit Market and Interbank Bond Market (People's Bank of China, 2006),
credit risk refers to the possibility of loss caused by default of borrowers or market
counterparties; in a broad sense, credit risk also includes the possibility of loss
caused by the change of borrower's credit rating and fulfilling capability, which leads
to the change of market value of borrower's debt.
The main purpose of risk management is to reduce income volatility and avoid
major losses. In the proper risk management process, it is necessary to identify risks,
measure and quantify risks, and formulate risk management strategies. Risk can be
dealt with by one of the following four methods: risk aversion, risk mitigation, risk
retention and risk transfer. Credit risk is managed in various ways. The most
important credit risk management technologies include selection, limit,
diversification and credit enhancement. Selection - A good credit risk management
begins with a good choice of counterparties and products. Limit - Limit the bank's
exposure to specific counterparts, avoiding a loss or a limited number of losses that
endanger the bank's solvency. Diversification - The allocation process of banks will
provide good risk diversification for different borrowers of different types, sectors
and regions. Credit enhancement - When a bank finds that it is exposed to a certain
type of counterparty, it can purchase financing guarantees or credit derivatives to
obtain credit protection. Through protection, the credit quality of the secured assets
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can be improved, which is also called credit risk mitigation.
I. Foreign Credit Risk Management Literature
i. Credit Risk Management Thought
Western commercial banks have a history of more than 300 years, which has
laid a solid theoretical foundation and effective institutional arrangements for bank
credit risk management. From Adam Smith's theory of asset management, the theory
of liability management in the 1960s, the theory of integrated asset-liability
management in the 1970s to the theory of off-balance sheet management and risky
asset management in the 1980s, as well as the emergence and rapid development of
financial engineering, the formation and continuous improvement of the Basel
system. After more than two centuries of development, the theory of bank credit risk
management has become a more systematic scientific system.
1. Asset Management Theory
Since the emergence of banking industry until the 1960s, the focus of
asset-liability management of commercial banks has been on asset management. The
representative theories mainly include reserve theory, commercial loan theory,
anticipated income theory, super money supply theory and asset shiftability theory.
Firstly, the Reserve Theory. That is to say, in order to cope with liquidity risk,
banks must maintain a certain level of cash assets or some short-term securities,
which is the traditional way for commercial banks to maintain liquidity.
Secondly, the Commercial Loan Theory, also known as the Real Bill Theory,
originated from the 18th century British economist Adam Smith's the Wealth of
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Nations. The theory holds that in order to cope with the unforeseen cash withdrawal
risk of depositors, banks must maintain the high liquidity of assets in the use of
funds, and loans must be short-term and self-repayment. For quite a long time, the
real bill theory has dominated the asset management theory of commercial banks.
Thirdly, the Shiftability Theory. After World War I, Moulton, an American
scholar, first proposed it in 1919 and it developed rapidly in the 1930s and 1940s.
The theory of asset convertibility is the product of the development of financial
market to certain extent, that is, the products of the more developed security
exchange market. Convertibility theory provides a theoretical basis for the
diversification of bank financial assets.
Fourthly, the Anticipated Theory. Anticipated theory is an important turning
point in the evolution of bank risk management theory. In 1949, Prochow, an
American scholar, published the theory of anticipated income on loan liquidity,
which marked the birth of the anticipated theory.
Fifthly, the Theory of Super-money Supply. With the diversification of money
forms and the increasing pressure of competition in bank credit market, the theory of
excess money supply appeared in the 1960s and 1970s. The theory holds that the
provision of money by bank credit is only one of the means by which banks achieve
the business objectives. In addition, banks have not only a variety of alternative
means, but also a wide range of objectives that can be achieved simultaneously.
2. Liability Management Theory
This theory is based on the vague definition of liabilities. Banks can give a
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variety of explanations on the issue of liabilities. Liability management can be
divided into two categories: one is to compensate for withdrawal deposits by
short-term borrowings, the other is to borrow money to meet increased borrowing
requirements, and to expand liabilities by borrowing from the Eurodollar market,
federal funds and so on. The purpose of liability management is to increase the
possibility of profit by expanding liabilities.
3. Integrated Asset-Liability Management Theory
Backe (1977), an American economist, put forward the theory of integrated
asset-liability management. This theory is a comprehensive one, which aims to
managing the risk of assets and liabilities of banks as a whole, and in a flexible and
changeable way. It can make corresponding policy adjustments with the change of
operating environment, collocates reasonably in the aspects of interest rate, term,
risk and liquidity, and organically combines various assets and liabilities to ensure
the profitability and assets of banks safety and liquidity. The goal of this kind of
management is to maximize the profit and to develop steadily in the long run under
the condition of the established risk tolerance. Interest rate risk management is only
a means to achieve the goal. The main contents of the management include interest
spread management, non-interest expenditure management, capital flow supervision,
loan quality control and so on.
4. Intermediary Business Management Theory
In the context of deregulation in the 1980s, the competition in banking industry
intensified unprecedentedly, and industrial and commercial enterprises began to
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participate in the competition of financial industry on a large scale, forcing
commercial banks to find new management ideas to get out of the predicament. It is
under this condition that the theory of intermediate business management, also
known as off-balance sheet business theory, has sprung up. The theory advocates
looking for new business areas beyond traditional bank liabilities and assets business,
and opening up new sources of profit. This theory holds that banks are institutions
that produce financial products and provide financial services, and also engage in
business activities that provide information services. Banks should join in all areas
related to information services.
5. Risk Asset Management Theory
The theory originated from the promulgation and implementation of Basel
Accord in July 1988. The accord unifies the understanding of capital composition,
introduces the ratio of risky assets, classifies assets and off-balance-sheet business
items with risk weights, familiarizes the concept of minimum capital adequacy ratio
to control the credit expansion of banks, and alerts banks to strictly control the
quality of credit assets.
ii.Credit Risk Management Method
In recent years, there have been a large number of empirical studies on
corporate credit risk abroad. Fitzpatrick (1932) compares the financial ratios of
bankrupt and non-bankrupt enterprises, and finds that the financial ratios of bankrupt
enterprises are poor. Fisher (1936), who originally proposes the discriminant analysis
method, has a simple idea: select a certain number of groupings from the data you
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want to separate, such as default and non-default, and then find out the explanatory
variables from the two categorizations and find the combination of these explanatory
variables. Durand (1941) first applies Fisher's method to economic and financial
fields. The Z-score model of Altman (1968) is the earliest and most famous
application of discriminant analysis in credit scoring. A multivariate analysis method
is used to discriminate the operating conditions of 66 manufacturing enterprises in
the United States. The explanatory variables include: working capital to assets,
retained earnings to assets, EBIT to assets, net value to liability and sales income to
assets. The model has strong discriminant ability and soon becomes a mainstream
technique to measure enterprise risk. Eisenbeis (1977) criticizes this method,
believing that it is only suitable for small sample distribution data, and it is difficult
to define the boundaries of data classification, such as good or bad. Nevertheless,
because of its simplicity and ease of estimation, this method is favored by banks.
Mester (1997) believes that 70% of the world's banks use the scoring model to
analyze small commercial loans.
On the basis of Altman (1968), many scholars, such as Fernandez of Spain
(1988), Altman, Marco and Varetto of Italy (1994), Izan of Australia (1984), Gloubos
and Grammatikos of Greece (1988), Ta and Seah of Singapore (1981), Altman and
Lavallee of Canada (1981), Ko of Japan (1982), Baetge, Huss and Niehaus of
Germany (1988) have studied the credit risk of enterprises by using different
financial ratios in different quantities and forms in the frameworks of linear
discriminant analysis, quadratic discriminant analysis and linear regression analysis.
50
Since the 1980s, logistic regression analysis has gradually replaced the
traditional discriminant analysis method. Martin (1977) uses logistic method and
discriminant analysis to predict 23 bankruptcy banks from 1975 to 1976, and finds
that the results of the two methods are similar. Lawrence and Ashadi (1995) use logit
model to analyze the management of problematic loans, and use a series of
borrowers and bank variables to analyze the choice of solutions. Campbell and
Dietrich (1983) use logit model to study mortgage loan and show that the age of
mortgage, the ratio of mortgage to loan value, interest rate and unemployment rate
have strong explanatory power in explaining the repayment, default and negligence
of mortgage loan. Laitinen (2000) applies Taylor series to logistic regression analysis
to predict corporate default and bankruptcy and finds that cash ratio, shareholder
equity ratio and cash flow ratio are important indicators to determine the level of
default risk. Gardner and Mills (1989) use logit model to estimate the default
probability of the current negligent loan, find that the default of the negligent
borrower is not necessarily the end of default, and suggest that the bank use this
method to determine the seriousness of the loan problem and establish the
corresponding response mechanism. Empirical study by Charitou, Neophytou and
Charalambous (2004) shows that logit model has stronger predictive ability than
other methods for predicting default risk.
The development of credit risk measurement technology as a symbol of modern
credit risk management has its characteristics and general development trend: from
qualitative analysis to quantitative analysis; from indicator form to modeled form or
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combination of the two; from the analysis of individual assets (or loans) to
combining-angle analysis; from the method of book value to the method of market
value; the transformation of variables describing risk from discrete form to
continuous form; considering not only the micro-characteristics of single borrower
and single lender, but also the impact of the macroeconomic environment; from a
single risk measurement model to a diversified and customized one. The change in
risk measurement mode also draws on the latest research results in related fields such
as econometrics, insurance actuarial science, optimization theory, simulation
technology, and so on, so as to continuously improve the precision and accuracy of
credit risk measurement.
The common practice adopted by western commercial banks is to
comprehensively control the assets and liabilities of banks. In addition, it is worth
mentioning that in the selection of specific strategies, attention is not only paid to the
management of various risks, but also to the management of portfolio risk, and the
diversification of risk portfolio is fully considered. In the choice of management
methods, the main characteristics are: to unify management of various risks, to use
more quantitative analysis with appropriate qualitative analysis, to transform the
previous indicator evaluation into model quantitative analysis gradually, and to
achieve a systematic and comprehensive assessment of the risk of credit portfolio,
and to apply advanced concepts in the financial field to practice timely.
II. Domestic Credit Risk Management Literature
The research on bank credit risk management in China started in the late 1980s.
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Since the 1990s, the government, practitioners and theorists have shown great
interest in financial risk, such as the translation of foreign credit risk theory, the
writing of books or the trial implementation of Western risk management methods,
which have achieved great results. From the theoretical point of view, a large number
of academic papers and works on financial risks, including credit risks of
commercial banks, are emerging at an unprecedented rate. Scholars have conducted
in-depth discussions from different perspectives, and the research contents, scope
and methods are becoming increasingly rich and mature.
i. Credit Risk Management of Commercial Banks
Xue Feng (1995) makes a systematic analysis of the credit risk from the
macro-environment, economic subject and economic system, and makes an
empirical description of the credit risk in China's actual economic and financial
operation, and puts forward some ideas and countermeasures to solve the problem of
bank credit risk. Zhong Wei and Li Xindan (1998) explain the formation mechanism
of credit risk from the internal risk of financial system. Zheng Yaodong et al. (1998)
discuss the role of the five-level classification of credit assets in preventing credit
risks. Han Ping and Xi Youmin (1999) analyze the characteristics, concrete
appearances and generating mechanism of credit risk of commercial banks in China
during the period of economic transition.
Gao Ling (2000) believes that the key to the management of bank credit risk
lies in the control of default risk of borrowing enterprises. By using the analytic
hierarchy process (AHP), an early warning model of bank credit risk in China is
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established, which playes a guiding role in the management of bank credit risk.
Liang Qi and Huang Gonghao (2002) make a tentative discussion on the
construction of credit risk management system of commercial banks in China. Shi
Hanxiang (2003) believes that the main reasons for the formation of credit risk in
state-owned commercial banks were the external factors such as administrative
intervention, enterprises escaping the financial obligations, the lagging development
of financial market, and the internal factors such as the low level of bank risk
management, the imperfect mechanism and the low quality of employees.
To manage the credit risk, banks must introduce the concept of integrated risk
management, and implement integrated risk management in all aspects from the
external environment governance and internal management. Jiang Fangming (2003)
analyzes the inherent mechanism of credit risk caused by the backward risk
management of commercial banks, and puts forward countermeasures and
suggestions from five aspects: risk culture, risk monitoring mode, risk monitoring
process, risk measurement and risk transfer. Ouyang Weimin (2003) considers the
basic principles and evolution of commercial bank risk management, analyzes the
current situation and characteristics of commercial bank risk in China and the
problems in risk management, and proposes means and suggestions to speed up the
modernization of commercial bank risk management in China.
Based on the impact of economic and financial globalization on credit risk
management of state-owned commercial banks, the Research Team of Shanghai
Branch of ICBC (2004) proposes that state-owned commercial banks should
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establish right risk management concepts, and designs several principles, overall
framework and strategic steps of credit risk management. The Project Team of
Hangzhou Institute of Finance Studies (2005) believes that in order to improve the
risk management system of credit assets of modern commercial banks in China,
three key elements must be focused on: system, culture and people. At the same time,
many principles should be grasped, namely the advanced principle, hierarchical
principle, dynamic principle, gradual principle, contingency principle and humanity
principle.
Zhao Zongjun et al. (2005) use the theory of asymmetric information as an
analytical tool, discourse the formation mechanism of credit risk management of
commercial banks, and put forward suggestions to improve the credit risk
management of commercial banks aiming at the credit risk caused by asymmetric
information. Sun Lingyun and Wu Baohong (2006) point out that due to the rapid
development of market economy and the serious inadaptability of financial property
right system reform, authorized operation of management and internal control and
self-discipline system, many banks still have serious deficiencies in the concept of
credit risk control and behavioral deviation, so that the rate of non-performing credit
assets is still at a high level. They also put forward specific suggestions on credit risk
management and optimization of credit risk control.
ii. Quantification of Credit Risk
Since the latest credit risk quantitative management model was developed by
international financial institutions and major western banks in recent years, the
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current domestic research and analysis on credit risk quantitative management
mainly focuses on the introduction, evaluation and reference of foreign models.
Some scholars have done some research on these models, and revised and perfected
the credit risk measurement models suitable for China.
Lu Yaoming et al. (1998) introduce some technical methods of credit risk
management of western commercial banks, including credit derivative transactions,
asset securitization and so on. Pong Sulin et al. (2001) aim at the credit market with
asymmetric information, analyze several common cases of loss of credit funds or
loss of opportunity and their mathematical principles, establish a decision-making
model of bank credit risk, and draw the following conclusions by giving
Kuhn-Tucker conditions: when collateral fails as a means of identifying the type of
enterprise risk, banks will have special requirements for the value of collateral
provided by enterprises in order to avoid credit risk.
Hao Liping et al. (2001) discuss the feasibility of artificial neural network and
its application in credit risk analysis, emphasis the construction of artificial neural
network model for credit risk analysis of commercial banks. A feasible neural
network model for credit risk assessment is obtained, which provides a scientific
basis for credit decision-making. Liang Shidong and Guo Zhong (2002) analyze the
reasons for the development of new credit risk models, and make a comparative
analysis of the representative modern credit risk models in the West. Pan Weilin
(2002) introduces in detail how to use VaR method to calculate the credit risk of
commercial banks. Wang Qiong and Chen Jinxian (2002) introduce credit risk
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pricing and KMV credit risk pricing model. Xiao Dongmei and Li Tao (2002) make
a systematic analysis of credit risk based on H∞ control theory in view of the
uncertainty of bank credit risk system model. Liu Wei and Chen Xiangzhi (2002)
establish a more scientific and feasible credit asset management model which can
meet the market requirements by using the methods of principal component analysis,
cluster analysis, discriminant analysis, multiple regression, random sampling and
statistical test of modern multivariate statistical theory.。
Wang Yuanyue et al. (2003) introduce the most popular credit risk model
construction method in the West - factor method, and briefly analyze its application
in the popular risk management models such as Basel Accord internal rating method,
Creditmetrics, CreditRisk Plus. Fan Nan (2003) believes that Creditmetrics is a
typical quantitative method which can be compared among different industries, and
it is a good supplement to the traditional methods of credit risk management of
commercial banks in China. Yuan Guiqiu (2003) analyzes the credit risk
measurement based on RAROC principle and believes that it is a feasible method for
China's financial institutions to study and apply credit risk at the present stage by
adjusting the credit grade transferring matrix which has been used publicly and
establishing credit risk pricing model. Zhou Chunxi (2003) introduces the method of
multi-level fuzzy mathematics into bank performance rating to make a
comprehensive evaluation, combining qualitative and quantitative analysis. Liu Fang
(2003) proposes to use the principal component analysis method to evaluate the
bank's operating performance, trying to avoid the problem that the comprehensive
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evaluation method is difficult to achieve fairness and objectivity in the setting of
weights, and strive to objectively and impartially evaluate the results. Ge Chaohao
and Ge Xuejian (2005) use cluster analysis and Fisher discriminant analysis to
measure and evaluate the credit risk of banks. The mathematical principle of the
model, indicators and data pre-processing are introduced in detail, and the
discriminant function of credit rating is established.
Liang Qi (2005) studies the measurement of credit loss of commercial banks'
portfolio on the basis of defining the relationship between bank loan loss and default
loss, elaborates the asset-related method of measuring default loss, and gives the
specific process of the additional method of enterprise asset return rate. Fu Qiang
and Li Yongtao (2005) establish a logistic model of the credit situation of listed
companies based on the annual report data and find that the multiple of interest
guarantee and the turnover of inventory are the key determinants of the credit of
listed companies, and use the model to evaluate the credit risk of listed companies
one year later. Zou Xinyue (2005) makes an empirical analysis of the credit risk of
184 listed companies in China, and clearly finds that the typical linear discriminant
model is effective in Chinese market and can provide investors with scientific
decision-making.
Guo Zhanqin and Zhou Zongfang (2006) set up a parametric programming
model based on interval number to deal with the uncertainty of credit risk and return.
By choosing the risk loss parameter alpha, banks can determine the optimal portfolio
weights of different risky credit projects under the equilibrium state of risk-return, so
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as to obtain the maximum return under the given risk. Long Haiming and Deng
Taixing (2006) set up a solvency model to discuss the quantitative relationship
between consumer debt ratio and expected default rate of consumer credit, and
compare the return and risk loss of non-performing loan rate with the actual default
rate, and provides a new idea for the management of consumer credit in commercial
banks. Wang Naijing and Youyonghua (2006) use the comprehensive financial data
of 100 listed companies as samples, and use principal component analysis and Fisher
discriminant analysis to evaluate the risk of enterprises. Zhai Dongsheng and Cao
Yunfa (2006) use Fisher discriminant analysis model to analyze the credit status of
listed companies in China and show that the overall discriminant accuracy of the
model is 90.38%.
After the promulgation of the new Basel Accord, many scholars have carried
out research. Xu Zhendong (2002) analyzes the capital requirements for bank credit
risk under the new standard method and internal evaluation method. Zhang Shi
(2002) introduces the main contents of the internal rating method proposed by the
new Basel Accord and the specific requirements for its implementation, and then
analyzes the ways to construct the internal rating of credit risk of commercial banks
management in China. Zhang Zhang (2002) describes the credit risk management
system and related technologies from the perspective of the internal rating method of
the new Basel Capital Accord, and organically combined the advanced risk concepts
with the actual operation of commercial banks in China. Chen Jianhua and Tang Libo
(2003) start with the analysis of the characteristics of IRB and the minimum standard
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of use, and proceed from the angle of risk management of commercial banks,
analyze the difference between the risk management system based on asset
classification and the risk management system based on IRB, and put forward the
business under the current conditions ,and point out that in order to establish risk
management system based on IRB law, commercial banks should reform and
improve the loan risk classification system. Yu Liyong and Cao Fengqi (2004)
analyze the impact of the new Basel Accord on the capital adequacy of Chinese
banks. Tan Ying (2005) introduces the internal allocation method of economic
capital commonly used in foreign commercial banks, and uses three methods of
economic capital allocation to compare the hypothetical data, thus found some
problems in China.
To sum up, the domestic theoretical research on bank credit risk management
mainly stays on introducing and drawing lessons from foreign advanced models.
Domestic research on bank credit risk management and model-building lacks
initiative and innovation. The main signs are as follows:
(1) The framework of integrated management of credit risk in commercial
banks is not complete enough. Many scholars only study and analyze some local
problems. Although some scholars try to use some mathematical methods to measure
bank credit risk, their ideas are not in line with international standards and are
difficult to be recognized.
(2) There is no reasonable and complete construction of bank credit risk
management system from the perspective of modern commercial bank system. In the
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analysis of existing credit risk problems of state-owned commercial banks, most
papers generally confine their research direction in external factors such as
macroeconomic system, and seldom pay attention to the bank's own imperfect risk
management system, weak implementation, backward means and other internal
factors.
(3) Quantitative analysis is less. Several copy the western models, neglect the
different accounting systems and national conditions and non-financial statement
factors, and lack of analysis from the technical level.
(4) The research on bank credit risk is mainly about credit risk, but the research
on credit market risk and internal control is insufficient.
(5) The analysis and construction of credit risk management system lay
particular emphasis on qualitative analysis, lacking of theoretical research combining
qualitative and quantitative analysis, and empirical research is even scarcer.
Summary
Credit enhancement of FGCs serves the financing of SMEs, which is a credit
enhancement instrument in nature and belongs to the scope of credit risk
management in terms of theoretical origin and technology. This chapter reviews the
main literature in three areas. On the financing difficulties of SMEs, foreign
literatures mainly include bank credit rationing, relationship lending, asymmetric
response to credit policy shocks, scale matching theory and growth cycle theory
under the condition of asymmetric information; domestic literatures mainly include
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system defect theory, enterprise self-defect theory, matching failure theory. The main
countermeasures and suggestions are to improve the loanability of SMEs funds and
improve the financing guarantee system. As for the literature on credit enhancement,
domestic and foreign literature focuses on discussing its function from the
perspective of financial instruments and financial markets.
Credit risk management is the core of bank operation, which has accumulated
abundant literature in its 300-year development process. The credit risk management
thoughts of foreign banks have gone through the stages of asset management theory,
liability management theory, integrated asset-liability management theory,
intermediary business management theory and risk asset management theory. Credit
risk management method is mainly quantitative analysis, supplemented by
qualitative analysis. From the previous indictors evaluation, it gradually transforms
into model measurement analysis, and realizes a systematic and comprehensive
assessment of the risk of credit portfolio. Domestic research on bank credit risk
management started in the late 1980s, or translated and introduced western credit
risk theory, or wrote books, or tried out western risk management methods, which
have achieved great results. From the theoretical point of view, a large number of
academic papers and works on financial risks, including credit risks of commercial
banks, are emerging at an unprecedented rate. Scholars have conducted in-depth
discussions from different perspectives, and the research contents, scope and
methods are becoming increasingly rich and mature.
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Chapter III Essence of Credit Enhancement of FGC
Financing guarantee is a special kind of creditor's rights. First, the economic
characteristics of creditor's rights are analyzed. It is deduced that creditor's rights
investors (lenders and bond investors) should abide by the conservative principle.
Then, from the perspective of credit risk management instruments, the connection
and difference among financing guarantee and CDS, credit insurance are analyzed.
3.1 Economic Analysis of Creditor's Rights
This section analyses the nature of creditor's rights and the conservative criteria
that creditor's rights investors should follow. As a special creditor's right, financing
guarantee should strictly abide by the conservative criterion, namely
zero-loss-principle.
I. Creditor's Rights Are Essentially Put Options
Black and Scholes (1973) not only give option BS pricing formula, but also
extend it to the valuation of corporate equity and creditor's rights. They think that the
value of equity is such a call option, the execution price is the par value of
unliquidated debt, the maturity price of basic assets is the value of the company
assets, and the creditor is the seller of put options, allowing shareholders to buy
company assets at the par value of creditor's rights at maturity.
Merton (1974) uses the option pricing principle to give the pricing method of
corporate debt, which is used to price credit risk. Merton (1974) gives the parabolic
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partial differential equation of stock market value: 0 =
 
 
              ⺁     
         ⺁  ， among them, V refers to the enterprise value,  
  refers to
instantaneous variance for enterprise returns，C is the amount paid by the enterprise
per unit time and F is the market value of the securities, ⺁  is the amount of
payment per unit time, r is the risk-free rate of return and t is the time.。
For creditor's rights, if B is the face value of creditor's rights, F is the market
value of creditor's rights and τ is the term of creditor's rights, then there are:      0，
     0，   < 0，    < 0，   < 0。Then it demonstrates that the risk premium of
creditor's rights increases with the increase in the ratio of the present value of debt to
the value of enterprise, increases with the fluctuation rate of enterprise value; and the
volatility of the value of creditor's rights increases with the increase of the ratio of
the present value of debt to the value of enterprise, and with the increase of the
volatility of enterprise's value.
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Income increases with the increase of enterprise value V
and income potential tends to be infinite
After reaching point B, the profit no longer increases with the
increase of enterprise value V,and with limited revenue potential
Equity Rights Income versus Creditor's Rights Income
Figure 3-1 Equity Rights Income versus Creditor's Rights Income
The profit models of creditor's rights and equity vary with the behavior of
creditors and shareholders. Figure 3-1 shows the income function of the creditor and
the shareholder in relation to the enterprise value V when the debt matures. B is the
principal of the debt. The creditor's income is capped by the principal returned at
maturity. But if the value of the enterprise is below the principal amount of the debt
(V<B), the creditor takes priority over the shareholder to get the whole value of the
company V, while the shareholder gets zero payment. However, if the value of the
company exceeds the repayable debt (V > B), the excess value (V-B) will be shared
by the shareholders. As a result, the shareholder's income increases with the increase
of enterprise value, and the earning potential is infinite; after the creditor's income
reaches a certain point (B), it is restricted and will not increase with the increase of
enterprise value. In short, the shareholder is in the position of buyer of call options,
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while the creditor is in the position of seller of put options. In reality, because the
ratio of creditor's interest income to principal (interest rate) is far less than 1, under
the limited liability institutional arrangements, creditors always face the situation of
limited income (pre-agreed interest income) and huge potential loss (total principal).
Therefore, creditors should pay special attention to the downside risks of the investee
enterprises. Creditors should pay special attention to enterprise value because the
downside risks have a reverse relationship with enterprise value.
II. Conservative Principle of Creditor's Rights Investment
i. Conservative Principles of Bank Loans
The practice of long-term business operation shows that the general principles
of ensuring the safety of principal, maintaining the liquidity and striving for
maximum profits should be adhered to in the operation of banks. Banks must try
their best to make the loans repaid in a timely and complete manner. If the loan
cannot be recovered in time, it will inevitably affect the liquidity of the bank. If bad
loans occur, the bank will suffer losses of funds and even shake the bank's credit.
Therefore, ensuring the safety of bank loan funds is the first principle that banks
must follow when loaning. In order to maintain the liquidity, commercial banks must
also rationally arrange the types and term structure of loans according to the types
and term structure of the sources of funds. On the premise of ensuring the safety of
funds, banks strive for maximum profits, seizing opportunities in loan business,
paying attention to the art and skills of loan pricing, aiming at obtain higher interest
income. Safety, liquidity and profitability are often contradictory in the specific
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implementation of loans. In general, banks always consider the safety and liquidity
of funds first. But in order to make full use of bank funds and increase profit
opportunities, they usually take into account by strengthening pre-loan review.
In the pre-loan review, banks act according to some specific loan principles. For
example, the "5Ws" principle was a set of specific lending principles once very
popular in the western banking industry. Banks must examine every loan application
from five aspects: who, why, what, when and how. Because these five words all
contain "W", they are also called "5Ws" principle. For example, the "5Cs" principle
is another set of specific rules commonly used in the loan review of western
commercial banks, which refers to the character, capital, capacity, collateral and
condition of borrowers.
1. The 5Ws Principle
Who is the borrower? This requires that focus should be placed on the situation
of the borrowers (including enterprises and individuals), including the credit status
of the borrowers, the ability to repay the loans, and the operation status of the
enterprises (or personal wealth). This is the most basic one of the "5Ws" principles.
If this one does not meet the standard, then there is no need to review other factors.
Why does the potential debtor borrow money? This requires a clear
understanding of the purpose of borrowing. Generally speaking, banks are more
willing to meet the demand for capital revolving loan or productive loans, especially
for working capital loans, which are mostly short-term, with commodity guarantees
and relatively safe. For consumption or speculative borrowing, banks have strict
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control, especially those with high risk of speculative borrowing. Banks are
particularly cautious when examining applications for such loans.
What is the borrower's guarantee? This requires determining how or in what
way the borrower mortgages or guarantees the loan. Although banks also carry out
credit loans, more often than not they ask borrowers for collateral, so that when
borrowers cannot repay the loan on time, they can sell the collateral to compensate
for the loss. In implementing this principle, banks strive to accurately grasp the
quality and quantity of the collaterals.
When can the borrower repay the loan? This requires determining the term or
duration of the loan. Banks generally consider the borrower's requirements in terms
of the duration and structure of the source of funds. The main purpose is to maintain
the solvency and liquidity of the bank.
How does the borrower repay the loan? This requires knowing whether the
borrower repays the loan at one time or in installments, and what kind of income the
borrower uses to repay the loan, whether the debt is repaid with normal income or
with liabilities. For those who pay off the loan at one time with normal income, the
bank can give a reasonable discount in the pricing of the loan, because the repayment
of such borrowers is more reliable. For loan installment borrowers, the interest rate
can be increased appropriately when the loan is priced, because the borrower's
economic situation is often not very good and the loan risk is habitually high.
2. The 5Cs Principle
Character, mainly refers to the willingness of borrower to pay their debts, is the
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most important factor in 5Cs. It is reflected in the borrower's past record of
repayment of debts, and banks generally have files on customers for inquiry. In
addition, western countries generally have institutions specializing in investigating
the credit position of individuals and enterprises. Banks basically know the credit
status of their new customers through such institutions. Therefore, in western
countries, whether individuals, enterprises or governments, they must maintain a
good record of debt servicing. If there is a forcible recourse by the court because of
the debt relationship, whoever will lose the opportunity to obtain loans.
Capital refers to the value, nature and quantity of borrower's capital. The bank
pays special attention to the stability and liquidity of the borrower's capital value in
the loan review. At the same time, great attention is paid to the borrower's net capital
value and its structure, as well as the amount and structure of borrower's liabilities.
All these are related to the safety of bank loans. Banks will agree to provide loans
only if they are sure that the credit is risk-free.
Capacity refers to the ability of the borrower to make extensive use of their
abilities and to make good use of their borrowed funds and make profits. The bank
judges the borrower's ability mainly by his/her age, business experience, business
ability, education level, adaptability, forecasting ability and ideology. No matter how
good a company's debt-servicing record and capital is, if there are no smart
entrepreneurs and managers, it is also likely to fail in the fierce competition, which
will lead to the loss of bank loans. As a result, banks are particularly careful in
examining borrower’s capacity.
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Collateral refers to the collateral that the borrower provides as a guarantee of
repayment. Banks usually require that such collateral be stable in value, insured by
insurance companies, and used as a widely marketable asset. In case the borrower
fails to repay the loan, the bank can quickly dispose of the collateral and sell it for
cash to mitigate the risk and loss of the loan.
The condition of an enterprise refers to its operation and external operating
environment. The bank mainly judges whether the enterprise's own operation is good
or not according to the enterprise's operation characteristics, operation methods,
technology conditions and labor relations. The assessment of the external business
environment of enterprises is based on factors such as political changes, social
environment, business cycle, seasonal changes, national income level, etc., as well as
the development trend of the industry and the level of competition in the same
industry, almost all the factors that the enterprises themselves cannot control. The
banks think it is necessary to know the conditions in advance and take measures to
ensure the safety of bank loans.
3. Three Core Factors
Whether "5Ws" principle or "5Cs" principle, we can sum up three elements:
human factors (such as "who" in the 5Ws principle, character and capacity in the 5Cs
principle, etc.), financial factors (such as "what" in the 5Ws principle, capital and
collateral in the 5Cs principle, etc.), economic factors (such as "why", "when",
"how" in the "5Ws" principle, and "conditions" in the "5Cs" principle, etc.). So when
banks implement the loan principles, the key points of its implementation are
70
formulated around these three elements.
Human factors. Banks always know as much as possible about the number of
shareholders of borrowing enterprises, the proportion structure of common
shareholders and preferred shareholders, and the status of private property of
shareholders. If necessary, they can conduct enquiries through credit investigation
agencies. The top managers of enterprise generally participate in decision-making.
Some of the leading managers themselves are shareholders of enterprises. Their
experience, educational background, ability and social relations have a significant
impact on the operation of enterprises. In addition, business operators with good
social relations tend to have a lot of convenience in purchasing, marketing and
utilizing new technologies and raising funds, while those with bad social relations
are not only difficult to get outside help when they encounter difficulties, but also
tend to fall into the situation of being pushed down by others.
Financial factors. Banks mainly use financial statements to analyze a series of
financial ratios, such as liquidity ratio, quick ratio, cash ratio, profitability, debt ratio
and so on. Banks usually require collateral from borrowers, such as goods purchased
with loans, or houses, land, and securities. Banks review of these collateral focuses
on legitimacy, safety and convenience。
Economic factors. The core of economic factor analysis is to evaluate the nature
of the enterprise, the market of the enterprise, the characteristics and development
trend of the industry in which the borrowing enterprise is located, to understand the
borrowing purpose of the enterprise and the time and mode of repayment, and to
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make a proper choice when pricing the loan according to the international and
domestic political and economic situation.
ii. Conservative Principle of Debt Security Investment
Debt security is an investment instrument with restricted returns. The correct
way to select debt security is to find specific and convincing safety factors that can
support the sacrifices made in terms of earnings. Debt security investment is an art of
negation. The focus of debt security investment is to avoid losses, so choosing debt
securities is a negating process. What need to do is to exclude and reject the prospect
bad investee, not to seek and accept them. In the field of debt security investment,
there is no such a thing as being overly critical or calculating. The correct process of
debt security investment should be to select a strong company, and then select the
highest yield of the debt security issued by the company. Debt securities that worth
buying should be able to withstand the test of recession. The more stable the nature
of the enterprise, the better the safety of its debt security. The debt securities of very
small enterprises do not qualify as fixed-value investment instruments. Of course,
large-scale per se is not enough to ensure safety, which must be built on the basis of
sufficient value of enterprises. The pursuit of yield at the cost of safety often results
in a loss. A prudent debt security investor should not allow himself to play the role of
an insurance company and risk losing money in order to earn extra profits.
3.2 Economic Analysis of Financing Guarantee
I. Relations among Participants in Financing Guarantee
Because of the high degree of information asymmetry, high risk of adverse
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selection and low credit rating of SMEs, banks are generally reluctant to grant loans
to SMEs. In order to improve their credit rating and obtain bank loans, SMEs need
the guarantee from third parties with higher credit rating. The existence of guarantor
reduces the degree of information asymmetry between credit parties. Guarantor
provides financing guarantee for SMEs with its own credit, promises banks that
when SMEs cannot repay loans on time as stipulated in the contract, and in case of
breach of contract, the guarantor will repay the loans for SMEs. In this way, the risk
of credit default of banks is greatly reduced, and it is easier for banks to choose to
lend to SMEs with guarantors. The guarantor who provides the financing guarantee
service charges the guarantee fee from the SMEs. Therefore, in financing guarantee
transactions, the main function of the guarantor is to enhance credit of the
guaranteed, and for the beneficiary (lending bank), the risk of the guaranteed has
been spread out to a large extent.
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Bank SMEs
The participation of the guarantor reduces the degree of information asymmetry,
the risk of adverse selection, and makes the transaction easier to achieve.
Financing Guarantee Company (Guarantor)
Once an enterprise fails to pay its principal and interest due,
the guarantor performs the contract on behalf of the debtor
Paying Guarantee Fees
Providing financing guarantee services
Relations among Participants in Financing Guarantee for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
Figure 3-2 Relations among SMEs Financing Guarantee Participants
According to the Guarantee Law of the People's Republic of China (1995),
financing guarantee is a kind of guarantee. The guarantee refers to the act that the
guarantor and the creditor agree that when the debtor fails to perform the debt, the
guarantor performs the debt or assumes responsibility according to the agreement.
Guarantee has the characteristics of equality, voluntariness, subordination, security
and complementarity. According to the Regulations on the Supervision and
Administration of Financing Guarantee Companies (2017), financing guarantee
refers to the guarantor's act of providing guarantee for the guaranteed borrowing,
issuing bonds and other debt financing; the so-called financing guarantee company
(FGC) refers to a limited liability company or an incorporated company which has
established and operated financing guarantee business according to law. The main
functions of financing guarantee include safeguarding the realization of creditor's
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rights, reducing information asymmetry, decreasing market transaction costs,
enhancing credit, risk management and economic leverage.
II. Economic Characteristics of Financing Guarantee
From the point of view of risk-return structure, financing guarantee is a kind of
non-standard debt securities. As an investor of this kind of debt securities, the FGC
can obtain a certain amount of premium income in advance, and its potential risk
(the possibility of loss) is the guaranteed amount which is tens of times the premium.
To be exact, every guarantee business can be regarded as a put option. FGC is in the
position of seller of put options, with restricted profits and unrestricted potential
losses. Generally, the risk of financing guarantee is the residual risk transferred by
banks and other credit institutions. Although it usually represents the risk of breach
of contract by the guaranteed, it is essentially a combination of various risks from
the guaranteed. Under the imperfect conditions of China's social credit system,
financing guarantee system, laws and regulations, financial supervision and financial
market, any unfavorable change of any variable will evolve into the residual risk to
FGCs. According to risk sources, the residual risk can be divided into: risks from
guaranteed enterprises, from government departments, from FGCs themselves, from
banks, from the guarantee system, and so on.
From the perspective of return-risk structure, financing guarantee business has
all the economic characteristics of debt security investment. Therefore, the FGC
should strictly follow the conservative principle of debt security investment in its
process of operation, and strictly regulate the process and rules of "negating and
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excluding". Moreover, almost all the clients of FGCs, namely the guaranteed
enterprises, are SMEs, who are usually not qualified to issue debt securities in the
capital market, because their credit rating is far lower than that of issuing debt
securities. This means that compared with debt security investments, financing
guarantees generally have greater risks. Therefore, for each financing guarantee
business, the FGC must take risk control as the core. The operating criteria are more
conservative than the "safe margin" principle of debt security investment, and should
be defined as the zero-loss-principle. The zero-loss-principle refers to that the whole
process of financing guarantee business follows the most stringent excluding and
screening rules, and in case of any suspicious situation, timely to take remedial
measures or terminate the business to control losses. If the zero-loss-principle is
violated, the financing guarantee business is not worth doing at all. Especially in the
case that China regards financing guarantee as a profit-making business at present,
FGC must strictly screen clients and strictly implement counter-guarantee measures
in accordance with the principle of zero loss; in the case of adverse macroeconomic
situation, even to suspend the guarantee business rather than to easily relaxes the
rules of conservative operation to result in huge compensation losses.
III. Case Study of Asymmetric Risk-Return Structure
On August 31, 2016, J Guarantee Company provided HY Company with a loan
guarantee contract with a period of one year and amount of 2.7 million yuan to P
Bank. The guarantee rate was 2%, and the guarantee fee was 54,000 yuan. On
September 9, 2016, P Bank granted loans totaling 2.7 million yuan to HY Company,
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agreeing to repay 1.7 million yuan in one time and 1 million yuan in monthly equal
amount. On September 20, 2017, P Bank served J Guarantee Company with the
Notice of Performance of Compensation. Because HY Company failed to repay the
principal and interest of the loan due on September 9, 2017. On the expiration date
of the loan contract, P Bank required J Guarantee Company to fulfill its guarantee
responsibility and repay the principal of the loan on behalf of the Guaranteed HY
Company of 2210186.43 yuan and the overdue interest of 860.74 yuan, totalling
RMB 2296187.17 yuan. On the day of receipt of the P Bank's notification, J
Guarantee Company fulfills its guarantee responsibility in accordance with the
contract and repays the loan principal and overdue interest to P Bank on behalf of the
guaranteed, totaling RMB 2,296,187.17 yuan.
Although there are various counter-guarantee clauses and penalties for breach
of contract in the guarantee contract, the negotiation failed. The guaranteed HY
company and three individuals did not recoup J Guarantee Company. After resorting
to the court, the counter-guarantor did not appear in court. Court default judgment
was: HY company repays the amount of compensation 2,296,187.17 yuan, and
interest (229 6187.17 yuan as capital, according to the loan interest rate of the
People's Bank of China during the same period, from September 20, 2017 to
September 23, 2017) and fine for breach of contract (the principal is 229687.17 yuan,
with an annual interest rate of 24%, which is calculated from September 24, 2017 to
the date of actual liquidation).
After the judgment came into effect, the guaranteed HY Company refused to
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comply with the court judgment. On April 27, 2018, J Guarantee Company applied
to the court for enforcement. As a result, the bank deposit account of the executed
person was 25.72 yuan, and the property allocated by the court was 423,170.34 yuan.
The total amount of the executed money was 423,196.06 yuan. After withholding the
execution fee of 26,941 yuan, the balance was 396,255.06 yuan. On April 27 and 28,
2018, the court announced the Restriction of High Consumption Order, against legal
person and natural persons of the guaranteed company. This is the end of the
guarantee business.
Even if we do not consider the troubles and costs of auditing, signing, litigation
and other activities, only calculate the income of guarantee fees, compensation losses
and recovery gains, then according to this business case, the results are as follows: In
the absence of breach of contract by the guaranteed, the income of the guarantee fee
is 54,000 yuan. In fact, the guaranteed breached the contract and J Guarantee
Company compensated 2296,187.17 yuan, then recovered 396,255.06 yuan through
court judgment and enforcement, and finally lost 1899,932.11 yuan. This case
calculates the real return-risk ratio of 1:35.2. That is to say, once the financing
guarantee business fails, the actual loss is 35.2 times the income of the guarantee fee.
Therefore, financing guarantee is a special debt security with strong asymmetry of
return-risk. FGC must strictly follow the principle of zero loss in its operation.
3.3 Comparisons between Financing Guarantee and CDS
I. Brief Introduction to Credit Default Swaps
Credit default swaps (CDS) is also called loan default insurance. The
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International Swap and Derivatives Association (ISDA) established standardized
credit default swap contracts in 1998. Since then, CDS transactions have developed
rapidly. In CDS transactions, one party wishing to avoid credit risk is called the
purchaser of credit protection, while the other party who is willing to bear credit risk
and provides credit protection to the risk transferring party is called the seller of
credit protection. The purchaser of CDS pays a certain fee to the seller on a regular
basis. Once a credit event occurs (mainly refers to the insolvency of the debt security
issuer), the CDS purchaser has the right to deliver the debt security to the CDS seller
at face value, thus effectively avoiding credit risk. The emergence of CDS solves the
liquidity problem of credit risk, makes credit risk trade and transfer like price risk,
and reduces the difficulty and cost of issuing debt securities.
In CDS contracts, the buyer of CDS pays the seller a certain fee on a regular
basis, which is generally expressed by a fixed basis point based on face value. If
there is no default event, the CDS seller will not have any cash outflow. Once the
default event occurs, the CDS seller is obliged to compensate the difference between
the face value of the debt security and the market value after the default event, or to
purchase the debt security held by the CDS buyer at the face value. Characteristically,
CDS belongs to options. Because the characteristics of options are that the buyer has
only rights but no obligations, while the seller has only obligations but no rights, so
once the debtor defaults, the buyer can ask for implementing CDS contract to pass
on credit risk. And the CDS point difference reflects the option premium.
CDS is transaction in which the credit risk of reference assets is transferred
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from the buyer of credit protection to the seller. The CDS buyer pays a fixed fee to
the seller who is willing to take risk protection during the contract period; while the
CDS seller accepts the fee, he undertakes to compensate the buyer for the loss of
default within the contract period when the corresponding credit default occurs. The
credit corresponding to the reference assets is either a certain credit or a basket of
credit. If any default occurs in a basket of credit, the seller must compensate the
other party for the loss.
II. Linkage between Financing Guarantee and CDS
Both are instruments for creditors to transfer the debtor's credit risk, and they
belong to credit risk derivatives in a broad sense. For creditors, the effect of
divesting and transferring credit risk is the same, which can protect the principal of
creditor's rights. For product pricing, the pricing principle of credit risk is the same.
Because of the large volume of CDS market transactions, financing guarantee can
effectively refer to the pricing of CDS under the same system, and adjust the
guarantee fee rate according to the degree of credit risk of the guaranteed enterprise.
III. Difference between Financing Guarantee and CDS
1. The legal status of the debtor is different.
Under CDS, the seller of credit protection can issue, create and trade CDS
without any relationship with the debtor and without the request or consent of the
debtor. CDS credit protection seller collects insurance premium from creditors
(credit protection buyer), and has no right to collect insurance premium from debtors.
Under CDS, the reference enterprise (debtor) does not need to sign a
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counter-guarantee contract with the seller of credit protection. Even if the debtor
defaults and causes the seller to compensate the buyer, the seller of credit protection
has no right to recover from the debtor.
In the financing guarantee business, the FGC provides guarantee to the creditor
at the request of the debtor. FGC collects guarantee fee from debtors, and usually has
no right to collect guarantee fee from the creditor. Both FGC and the guaranteed
enterprise must sign the counter-guarantee contract. Once the debtor defaults and
causes the FGC to fulfill its obligation of compensation according to the financing
guarantee contract, it can recover according to the counter-guarantee contract.
2. The degree of standardization of contracts varies.
CDS contracts have a higher degree of standardization, which is conducive to
reducing transaction costs; financing guarantee contracts have a lower degree of
standardization and higher transaction costs. Under CDS, the number of buyers is
usually uncertain, and the actual creditor-debtor relationship is not required. In
financing guarantee business, creditors and debtors are usually specific and have real
lending relationship in reality. Under CDS, the amount of CDS issued or created by
financial institutions is not limited by the size of the reference debt; in financing
guarantee business, the maximum amount of guarantee is the amount of the primary
creditor's rights. Under CDS, the amount of CDS issued or created by financial
institutions may be higher or lower than the amount of reference debt; in the
guarantee business, the amount usually guaranteed by FGC is the same as or less
than the amount of the principal claim. The buyer of CDS is not necessarily the
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creditor of the reference debt; the beneficiary of the financing guarantee must be the
creditor of the debt under the primary contract.
Under CDS, the precondition for credit protection seller to pay the buyer is the
credit events stipulated in CDS agreement. In the guarantee business, the factors
leading to the payment by the guarantee company include all default events
stipulated in the guarantee contract, and the scope of default events is often much
larger than that of credit events. The validity of CDS agreement is not affected by the
reference debt relationship. Even though the reference debt relationship is invalid,
the CDS agreement is still valid. Generally, the validity of the guarantee contract is
affected by the validity of the primary contract, the primary contract is invalid, and
the guarantee contract is invalid. CDS can be transferred separately from the
reference debt relationship, thus promoting the prosperity and development of the
financial derivatives market. It is conducive for banks to obtain profits linked to the
reference debt without capital investment when no credit event occurs. It is also
conducive to dispersing the risk concentration of banks. Guarantee contracts cannot
be transferred separately from the primary contract.
3. The final effect of risk management is different.
CDS, as the most widely used credit derivatives in the international financial
market, plays an important role in innovative financial business such as asset
securitization. It can optimize asset allocation actively, hedge risks and carry out
active risk management. CDS is an important part of innovative financial business.
In the financing guarantee business, the FGC is in a passive position in dealing with
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the risk, and financing guarantee does not have the function of dispersing credit risk
in a large scale. Therefore, FGC must operate the financing guarantee business in
line with the prudent principle of zero loss.
3.4 Comparisons between Financing Guarantee and Credit Insurance
I. Links between Financing Guarantee and Credit Insurance
1. The Same Basis for Production
Reducing credit risk is the common foundation of financing guarantee and
credit insurance. Credit risk exists in economic and social exchanges. In order to
protect the rights and interests and reduce losses caused by risks, it is badly need to
avoid risks and make up for losses. Both financing guarantee and credit insurance
arise because of the existence of risks.
2. The Same as Risk Management Instruments
In a mature market economy, both financing guarantee and credit insurance are
effective means for market transaction participants to manage and disperse risks.
They play an important role in protecting the rights and interests of market
transaction participants and reducing risks. In order to maximize their own interests,
market participants usually combine financing guarantee with credit insurance.
II. Differences between Financing Guarantee and Credit Insurance
1. Different Functions
The primary function of financing guarantee is to guarantee the realization of
creditor's rights and promote the financing. The function of insurance is to
compensate the insured when the loss agreed upon in the insurance contract occurs.
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The function of financing guarantee is firstly to promote financing, secondly to
compensate the creditor when the debtor defaults.
2. Different Operating Mechanism
For financing guarantee, the carrier of financial guarantee liability is generally
the property of the guarantor itself; for insurance, the carrier of compensation
responsibility is mainly the insurance fund formed by policyholders paying
premiums. Guarantee fund has the characteristics of closeness, while the
composition of insurance fund has the characteristics of openness.
The operation concept of financing guarantee is the principle of zero loss which
means that the premise of providing financing guarantee is to avoid compensation as
far as possible. Financing guarantee carries out risk measurement and business
operation according to the principle of zero loss and the guarantee-all-the way means.
It must track and monitor the change of risks, and takes corresponding measures to
deal the existing and potential risk factors, so as to reduce the risk of customer
default and ensure the interests of FGC. Insurance calculates and collects premiums
according to the probability of loss and does not need to track and monitor the risk of
customers. Insurance only needs to measure the risk according to the probability and
provide compensation when the risk occurs. The premise of insurance is that there
must be compensation behavior, as long as the compensation does not exceed the
estimated rate, it can make profits.
Generally, financing guarantee cannot operate in accordance with "law of large
numbers" as insurance does. The number of guarantees provided by FGC is limited
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by its financial resources and ability to disperse risks, and the amount of
compensation often exceeds the guarantee fee income. Therefore, the law of large
numbers is generally not applicable to guarantee business, and the principle of zero
loss must be implemented in guarantee business.
The insurance compensation is due to the proximate causes, and the financing
guarantee compensation is due to the default results. Insurance follows the principle
of proximate cause, and only the loss proximately caused by insured perils can be
compensated. Generally, the guarantee liability should be fulfilled as long as the
consequences of the loss occur, no matter what causes the loss.
3. Different Legal Relations
The legal relationship of financing guarantee is subordinate. Guarantee contract
is the subordinate contract of the main contract according to the Guarantee Law,
while insurance contract is an independent legal relationship. The legal relationship
of guarantee is restrictive, and the guarantor has the right to restrict the property
rights of the guaranteed, which derives that the guarantor has the right to supervise
the production and business activities of the guaranteed. While the insurer generally
has no right to restrict the property of the insured and has no right to supervise its
business activities. Guarantee is based on the principle of general good faith, and the
risk of dishonesty is borne by the guarantor, that is, the guarantor can't cancel the
guarantee contract because of fault and general dishonesty of the guaranteed unless
the guaranteed and the creditor collude to defraud the guarantor to provide the
guarantee. Insurance is based on the principle of utmost good faith. The risk of
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dishonesty is generally borne by the insured.
4. Different Characteristics of Economic Relations
Guarantee has significant personalization characteristics, while insurance does
not. Financing guarantee is not only the proof of ability of the guaranteed to perform
the contract, but also the recognition and guarantee of credit quality of the
guaranteed. It is a significant personalized social relationship. The guarantor should
conduct a comprehensive examination and evaluation of the quality and ability of the
guaranteed. Insurance is a relatively simple economic relationship. Only when there
is a possibility of claims settlement in the event of an insurance accident, can the
insurer conduct in-depth examination and evaluation of the insured and the insurance
accident. This occasion accounts for a very small proportion of the overall insurance
business.
Summary
Financing guarantee is a special kind of creditor's rights, so this chapter first
analyses the economic characteristics of creditor's rights. According to the analysis
of Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1974), the essence of creditor's rights is put
options. Creditor is in the position of seller. Its return-risk portfolio is characterized
by: restricted income and the almost unlimited potential loss (whole principal is
subject to loss). Creditor (lender and debt security investor) should abide by the
principle of conservatism. In order to ensure the safety of funds, banks usually
strictly abide by conservative principles of loan review, such as the "5Ws" principle
(who, why, what, when, how), the "5Cs" principle (Character, Capital, Capacity,
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Collateral, Condition), aiming at making a detailed assessment of the human,
financial and economic factors of borrowing enterprises. The key point of debt
security investment is to avoid loss, and the pursuit of yield at the cost of safety is
often not worth the loss. Therefore, debt security selection is a negating process. In
the field of debt security investment, there is no behavior that can be called excessive
criticism or haggling.
Financing guarantee means that the guarantor provides guarantee for the
guaranteed borrowing, issuing bonds and other debt financing. From the point of
view of return- risk structure, financing guarantee product is a kind of non-standard
debt security. As an investor of this kind of debt security, FGC can obtain a certain
amount of premium in advance, and its potential risk (the possibility of loss) is tens
of times that of premium. Every guarantee business can be regarded as a put option,
and FGC is in the position of seller of put options, with limited return and unlimited
potential losses. The financing guarantee business has all the economic
characteristics of debt security investment, and FGC should follow the conservative
principle of debt security investment in its operation. FGC must take risk control as
the core in handling every financing guarantee business. The operating criteria are
more conservative than the "safe margin" principle of debt security investment, and
they should follow the zero-loss- principle. If the principle of zero loss is violated,
the financing guarantee business is not worth operating.
As a credit risk management tool, financing guarantee has both commons and
difference with CDS. For creditors, the effect of divesting and transferring credit risk
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is the same, both of which can protect the principal of creditor's rights; for product
pricing, the pricing principle of credit risk is the same. The difference between the
two is that the legal status of the debtor, the degree of standardization of the contract,
and the final effect of risk treatment.
Financing guarantee and credit insurance are both based on the existence of
credit risk. They are effective means for market transaction participants to manage
and disperse risks, and play an important role in protecting the rights and interests of
market transaction participants and reducing risks. The main differences between
them are: different functions, different operating mechanisms, different legal
relations and different characteristics of economic relations.
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Chapter IV Spirit of Doer and Enterprise Credit Enhancement
Firstly, this chapter defines the spirit of doer, analyses the matching between the
spirit of doer and the principle of zero loss of financing guarantee. Then, through the
case analysis of Mr. A, it is found that FGC must resolutely reject the financing
guarantee applications of those opportunist owners who lack professional and
dedicated spirit.
4.1 Zero-Loss-Principle and Doer Spirit
I. Doer and Doer Spirit
Financing guarantee is a special kind of creditor's rights, and its asymmetry of
return-risk is very pronounced. Generally, the guaranteed enterprises are usually
SMEs, and their credit risk is usually much greater than that of the large enterprises
qualified to issue normal debt securities. Therefore, for each financing guarantee
business, the FGC must take strict control of downside risk as the core and fully
implement the principle of zero loss. Especially under the condition that China
regards the financing guarantee business as a profit-making business which means
FGC bears profits and losses with its own account. That is to say, if any financing
guarantee business does not conform to the principle of zero loss, it is not worth
trying at all.
In addition, financing guarantee is the proof of the ability of the guaranteed to
perform the contract, the recognition and guarantee of the reputation quality of the
guaranteed and it is a remarkable personalized social relationship. The guarantor
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should conduct an all-round examination and evaluation of the quality, ability and
social relations of the guaranteed. The principle of zero loss not only requires the
FGC to implement strict counter-guarantee measures for every guarantee business,
surmount the relevant restrictions of the current company law on limited liability,
and let the owner or actual controller of the guaranteed enterprise bear joint
liabilities through the counter-guarantee agreement. That is, once the guaranteed
enterprise breaches the contract, it must be liable for joint liabilities and FGC can
recover the compensation from the owners or actual controllers according to the
counter-guarantee agreement. And more importantly, FGC must choose the right
person from the beginning, because the key to the success or failure of SMEs lies in
the owners and actual controllers. Financing guarantee business will be far more
critical on the selection criteria for business owners than bank loan business, because
the credit risk of SMEs depends largely on their business owners or actual
controllers. Only through the factor of owner or actual controller, can FGC
effectively identify, measure and control the financing guarantee risk.
Taking Foshan financing guarantee as an example, Foshan is mainly a private
economy. In 2016, the private economy accounted for 63.5% of the whole economy.
There are more than 200,000 private enterprises and private SMEs constitute the
main service clients of Foshan FGCs. In theory, the zero-loss-principle implemented
by the FGC should match the actual controllers of the guaranteed enterprise with
stable and conservative personality traits, such as prudence and low-keyed, keen and
flexible, practical and tenacious, honesty and trustworthiness, and good social
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reputation. Through text analysis of sampled business documents, it is found that the
main characteristics of the actual controllers of the guaranteed enterprises are: (1)
rich industry experience, 10-30 years of industry experience, most have 15-20 years
of industry experience; (2) low-keyed and pragmatic, stable operation; (3) insight,
quick thinking; (4) stable source of customers, the abundant human relations, good
reputation. The above characteristics are different from the entrepreneurship defined
by the current academic community. The core of entrepreneurship is innovation. The
above characteristics mainly emphasize focus, experience and sound operation.
Essentially, equity investment emphasizes entrepreneurship, because the return-risk
of equity investment instruments is symmetric, and entrepreneurship with innovation
and risk as its core features can bring huge upside profit space for equity investors.
However, for the financing guarantee business, because of the asymmetry of
return-risk, FGC emphasizes the principle of zero loss and the overall control of the
downside risk, so it prefers the steady and continuous operation of enterprises and
prudent and pragmatic entrepreneurs. Therefore, the above characteristics of
financing guarantee clients are summarized as the spirit of doer.
A doer is a concept contrary to a visionary or a theorist. The core characteristic
of doer is to seek the sustained survival and development of enterprises and
undertakings with a go-getter attitude. In reality, the concept of doer is broader than
that of entrepreneur. In fact, entrepreneur is also a special kind of doers. Doers pay
more attention to cherishing the present, doing practical work well, focusing on areas
of expertise, striving for ambition, and beginning well and ending well.
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When referring to the spirit of doer, it is necessary to mention the background
of the slogan "empty talk misleads the nation, practical work rejuvenates the
country". In 1992, during the mid-term of China's reform and opening-up, Deng
Xiaoping's speech on the Southern Tour mentioned that "empty talk misleads the
country and practical work to rejuvenate the country". Shenzhen Shekou Industrial
Zone resolutely erected it as a sign on Shekou Industrial Avenue, which not only
inspired Shenzhen people to build special economic zones and strive for reform, but
also quickly became the catchwords and mottos that inspired people of the whole
nation to be enterprising and ambitious. After the Eighteenth National Congress of
the Communist Party of China, "empty talk misleads the nation, practical work
rejuvenates the country " once again appeared in the prominent position of
newspapers, television and the Internet. From the perspective of societal culture and
historical background, the essence of doer is a person who pursues wealth and career
through vigorous efforts and step-by-step stability. The typical groups of doers are
usually well-managed SMEs owners.
Some people generalize that the characteristics of a doer are bearing
accountability, enduring loneliness, tolerating solitude, withstanding pressure,
surviving the pain, resisting temptation, standing up to ups and downs, weathering
humiliation, holding out the blow and preserving vitality. The core of the doer spirit
is to practice the law of value in the market by focusing, specializing and sticking to
what is determined to do. In short, the spirit of doer is the dedicated character of
being practical, deep-going, persistent, capable and excellent.
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II. Roles of Doer Spirit
The spirit of doer accords with the inherent requirements of law of value and
law of competition. According to the principle of Marxist economics, SMEs run by
doers are commodity producers, while commodities are labor products for exchange,
which have two attributes of use value and value. The value of a commodity is
determined by the socially necessary labor time consumed in the production of the
commodity. Commodity exchange is based on the amount of value. The spirit of
doer can promote enterprises to improve production, management, labor productivity,
and to reduce individual working time in unit commodities, thereby improving the
market competition status and profit opportunities of enterprises.
The spirit of doer usually pursues the enterprising philosophy of "if others
succeed by exerting one ounce of effort, I will exert a hundred times as much effort".
The Doctrine of the Mean records: "If another man succeeds by one effort, he will
use a hundred efforts. If another man succeeds by ten efforts, he will use a thousand.
Let a man proceed in this way, and, though dull, he will surely become intelligent;
though weak, he will surely become strong. "Mr. Inamori once summarized the
results of life and career as a formula: the results of life or career = thinking mode *
enthusiasm * ability, in which the values of enthusiasm and ability range from 0 to
100 points, and the values of thinking mode range from negative 100 to positive 100
points (-100,100). Mr. Inamori believes that even people with ordinary abilities can
be very successful as long as s/he has a good way of thinking and devotes enough
enthusiasm. Actually, from the dynamic point of view, the spirit of doer will directly
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affect the two elements of enthusiasm and thinking mode in the equation, and in the
long run, it will also increase the ability in the equation, thus promoting the doer to
achieve sustainable success in his career.
In terms of entrepreneurs' human capital, the doer spirit can make up for the
shortcomings of low educational background to a certain extent. After all, the
practice produces true knowledge and achievements. According to the analysis of the
sampled business documents, only 9 of the actual controllers of the guaranteed
enterprises have college or higher education, accounting for 30%, while the other
70% have education of high school or below. In view of the especially historical and
social background of China at that time, Foshan entrepreneurs in their 50s generally
have low educational background, but entire period of actual operation since their
start-up is 6-31 years, averaging 16.5 years. Their long-term work in the industry has
enabled them to accumulate considerable experience and a certain scale of market
and wealth.
In addition, doer spirit helps to accumulate social capital. The entrepreneur's
social capital is characterized by his/her personal attachment, and is the sum of the
network system, social reputation and trust centered on the entrepreneur's individual.
On the one hand, the spirit of doer can maintain, consolidate and expand the
reputation of entrepreneurs in the industry and in the region, and accumulate market
social capital; on the other hand, the spirit of doer can help entrepreneur establish
and maintain various (direct or indirect) links with government functional
departments, and accumulate institutional social capital. Social capital can provide
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enterprise with key knowledge and resources, thus helping enterprise to integrate
internal and external resources, and to obtain development opportunities from the
external environment. In so doing, the doer spirit favors SMEs to gain competitive
advantage and improve enterprise performance and enterprise value.
4.2 Doer Spirit and Enterprise Value
I. Enterprise Value and Its Determinants
According to financial economics theory, enterprise value (EV) is the
discounted value of all future cash flows generated by the enterprise, which is
expressed by formula as follows:   =  =h
   鳰 
   ⺁  
  ，among them, t is the future time
point, CFt is the profit of t time, k is the discount rate, and ∑ is the summation sign.
This formula reveals four factors that affect the value of an enterprise: (a) the
number of times of earnings persistence (N), (b) the size of each return (CFt), (c) the
discounted interest rate (k) and, (d) the time-point distribution of earnings (t).
Keeping other conditions unchanged, the number of times (N) and the size of each
return (CFt) are positively associated with EV, and the discounted interest rate (k)
and the time distribution (t) positively associated with EV.
As a special creditor's right, the risk of financing guarantee is inversely
proportional to the value of the guaranteed enterprise. In other words, other
conditions remain unchanged, the greater the value of the guaranteed enterprise, the
smaller the possibility of default and the lower the risk of financing guarantee
business; on the contrary, the smaller the value of the guaranteed enterprise, the
greater the possibility of default and the higher the risk of financing guarantee
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business. Therefore, the aforementioned four factors that determine EV will affect
the risk of financing guarantee business through the EV. According to this logic, the
following chapters will directly analyze the impact of the factors discussed on EV
when discussing the credit enhancement model of FGC. In theory, as long as the
minimum boundary of the guaranteed enterprise EV is far greater than 0, the
guaranteed client has no motive for breach of contract, and the financing guarantee
business can achieve zero-loss.
II. Doer Spirit and Enterprise Value
i. Learning Curve Effect and Enterprise Value
1. Learning Curve Effect
Learning curve is a dynamic production function, which is first summarized in
the aircraft manufacturing industry. Dr. Wright of Cornell University (1936)
summarizes the experience of aircraft manufacturing and find that when the
cumulative output of aircraft doubled, the average working hours decreased by about
20%, that is to say, to 80% before the output doubled. For the first time, the
relationship between average working hours and cumulative output is called learning
curve. The learning curve function can be described by the following models: y =
    ，Among them, y is the man-hour needed to produce unit x, k is the man-hour
needed to produce unit 1, and   is the learning rate index, 0 <   < 1. The above
formula can be visualized in Figure 4-1 below.
Learning curve effect is helpful to intuitively understand the economic meaning
of doer spirit from the aspect of cost. If there is an obvious learning effect in the
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production process, the product cost will decrease with the increase of accumulated
output, and then enterprise can use the learning curve to establish cost advantage and
competitive advantage by focusing and sticking to what is determined to do.
Learning Curve
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Figure 4-1 Learning Curve
Although the learning curve effect is summarized from the manufacturing
process, it can be easily extended to other activities involving skill accumulation and
knowledge accumulation. The learning curve effect brought about by concentration
and experience accumulation is not only reflected in reducing operating costs, but
also in expanding sales opportunities, optimizing sales markets and increasing sales
revenue, which ultimately results in the improvement of net profit of enterprise.
2. Learning Curve Effect and Enterprise Value
As before, the spirit of doer can ensure that enterprise and entrepreneur get
sufficient learning curve effect. The learning curve effect can enhance EV by
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increasing the size of the return (CFt) and the number of times the return lasts (N) in
the enterprise valuation formula. The main mechanisms are as follows: (1) the spirit
of doer helps to expand revenues by learning curve effect; (2) the spirit of doer helps
to reduce average operating costs by learning curve effect; (3) the spirit of doer itself
can improve the number of net income perseverance.
If d is used to express the spirit of doer, substituting d into the formula of
enterprise valuation, we can get following formula:
  䖘  =  =0
  䖘  ⺁   䖘 
      
  ，
where，
 ⺁   䖘 
 䖘
  0，
   䖘 
 䖘
  0，
Thus,
   䖘 
 䖘
  0，that is, the spirit of doer is conducive to improving EV.
ii. Social Capital and Enterprise Value
Social capital refers to the collection of social relations network of entrepreneur,
which plays the roles of resource grabbing and ability endowing. According to the
nature of social network, it can be divided into two categories: market-oriented
social capital and institutional-oriented social capital. Market-oriented social capital
refers to the social network established by entrepreneur and their main business
partners (such as middlemen-suppliers and strategic partners). Institutional-oriented
social capital refers to the societal networking among entrepreneur, government
agencies and industry authorities (such as industry, commerce, taxation and other
government administrative agencies, and trade associations, etc.).
The entrepreneur with the spirit of doer can accumulate not only abundant
human capital, but also extensive and profound social capital in the process of doing
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businesses that they recognize as practical, deep-going, long-term, capable and
excellent. In the process of mutual promotion of human capital, social capital and
physical capital, the capability of doers to identify and capture market opportunities
is gradually improved, and the ability of enterprises to create and realize value is
constantly enriched, which ultimately leads to the enlarging EV.
According to the relationship between the risk of financing guarantee business
and EV, it can be inferred that: the spirit of doer is conducive to reducing
the risk of financing guarantee business.
4.2 Case Study of Doer Spirit and Enterprise Credit Enhancement
II. Background note
The asymmetric nature of return-risk of financing guarantee business
determines that the distribution of the successful cases versus the failure ones is also
extremely asymmetric. From the perspective of compensation rate indicator, the
compensation rate of Foshan financing guarantee during 2015 to 2017 were 3.16%,
1.77% and 2.00% respectively, which belonged to the typical small probability.
Compensation means that there is a problem in the financing guarantee business. If
the compensatory business is deducted from the entire business, it will be successful
business. From 2015 to 2017, the success rates of Foshan financing guarantee
business were 96.84%, 98.23% and 98.00%, respectively. Because successful cases
play an absolute dominant role in financing guarantee business, the failure ones are
small probability events. Because the distribution of successful samples versus
failure ones in financing guarantee business is severely asymmetrical, the commonly
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used quantitative methods cannot be used to carry out regression analysis, in this
instance only case study method can be used.
In addition, considering the return-risk asymmetry of financing guarantee and
the principle of zero loss in business operation, it is more meaningful and feasible to
select typical cases from a limited number of failure business to focused research.
Therefore, the case studies in this chapter and subsequent chapters are all
compensatory business, i.e. failure cases. As far as the average situation of Foshan
FGCs is concerned, the number of guaranteed clients of each FGC is less than 200
per year, and the number of failure business per year is less than 5. Whether from the
perspective of each FGC or the whole financing guarantee industry, the failure cases
are more scarce and precious. In view of the inherent requirement of the principle of
zero loss in business operation, failure cases are worth studying in order to fully and
comprehensively draw lessons from them.
II. Basic Situation of Guarantee Business Case
Mr. A, born in 1965, is the actual controller of YH Company. YH Company was
founded on July 30, 1996. Its registered capital was 1 million yuan, and Mr. A paid
700,000 yuan, accounting for 70% of the shares. The weaving business of YH
Company was under the responsibility of Mr. A, while hardware products business
was in the charge of the other shareholder. In 1997, the hardware business ceased
production and withdrew. The other shareholder did not participate in the
management of YH Company. Since then, the company only operated the weaving
business, and its actual controller was Mr. A. After the amendment of the Company
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Law in October 2005, in order to improve the organizational structure of YH
Company, on September 3, 2006, the shareholders meeting passed a resolution, and
the other shareholder transferred all his shares to Mr. A, and the nature of the
enterprise was changed to limited liability company wholly owned by natural person.
Mr. A continued to be the executive director and his wife was the supervisor.
YH Company set up a new shoe factory at the end of 2010 and put into
production after the Spring Festival of 2011. Because shoe manufacturing involved
environmental protection approval and export licenses of new company, it was
decided not to set up new company, and continue to operate in the name of YH
Company and expand its business scope. In February 2012, HY Company was
approved by the Bureau of Industry and Commerce to change its business scope.
Shoe factory was closed in the second half of 2014. Because shoe market was
depressed, the order of shoe factory declined, and the cost of manpower increased,
which caused the profit of shoe factory to decline, Mr. A decided to stop the
production and operation of the shoe factory.
On September 5, 2011, Mr. A established HS restaurant, which operates in the
form of individual business. His wife was the individual operator and ran the
catering business, which was mainly featuring fish. Up to the time of applying for
financing guarantee, the average monthly revenue reached more than 2.8 million
yuan, and HS restaurant had about 150 employees. The monthly cost was composed
of 450,000 yuan of labor cost, 100,000 yuan of water and electricity cost, 60,000
yuan of tax and fee, 130,000 yuan of rent; and 45% of the revenue went to raw
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materials, totaling about 1.8 million yuan.
At the end of 2011, another limited liability company, HS Restaurant Co., Ltd.
(HS Company for short) was set up in another town's commercial complex, which
rented 1-3 storeys of the office buildings. HS Company invested 26 million yuan in
renovation, started trial operation at the end of 2012, and formally obtained a
business license on March 29, 2013, and had 50 waiters and 30 cooks. Mr. A. was
the legal representative and actual controller of HS Company. With the gradual
expansion of business, the original HS restaurant could no longer meet the daily
business needs, therefore the company and its Hong Kong partners re-upgraded the
canteen and planned to invest 12 million yuan. The initial investment of 5.5 million
yuan was funded by Hong Kong partner. Later, the partner applied for share
withdrawal. Therefore, the initial investment of 5.5 million yuan, together with half
of the profit of 5 million yuan of the old HS restaurant, i.e. 2.5 million yuan, totaling
8 million yuan, was returned to the Hong Kong partner.
In August 2016, YH Company applied to J Guarantee Company for loan
guarantee. The nature of the loan was working capital loan, the application amount
was 2.7 million yuan, and the period was 12 months, agreeing to repay the loan in
the following manner: one-time repay 1 .7 million yuan, and equally repay the other
1 million yuan on monthly basis. At that time, the family assets and liabilities of
51-year-old Mr. A were: real estate with appraisal value of 2.8448 million yuan;
loans with a total amount of 900,000 yuan and outstanding balance of 644,000 yuan.
And monthly repayment of 74,143 yuan went to micro-credit company. Loans from
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micro-credit company were used to repay due loans from Z Bank at the beginning of
the year.
YH Company, the guaranteed enterprise, mainly dealt in the hosiery industry,
and most of its products were exported. After more than 10 years of development, it
had become a hosiery company with a certain scale and distinct product
characteristics. By 2016, the company had more than 100 modern hosiery looms,
and could independently complete all hosiery weaving processes including knitting,
stitching, setting, hot stamping, finishing and packaging.
In credit assessment, J Guarantee Company considered that besides the real
estate of the actual controller (28,448,000 yuan) as counter-guarantee collateral, a
batch of machinery and equipment under YH Company's name had an appraised
value of about 3 million yuan as counter-collateral; in addition, it provided land and
ground buildings to be subleased to the guarantee company with an appraised value
of 5.07 million yuan. The original lease contract was kept by J Guarantee Company
and a batch of inventory was used as collateral. The final credit rating was rated B,
with a qualitative score of 64.49.
On August 31, 2016, J Guarantee Company signed a guarantee contract with
YH Company, which agreed to provide guarantee for YH Company to P Bank for a
sum of 2.7 million yuan. On September 20, 2017, P Bank served "Notice of
Performance of Compensation" to J Guarantee Company. Because YH Company
failed to repay the principal and interest on the date of maturity of the loan, J
Guarantee Company was required to fulfill the guarantor liability in accordance with
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the contract. J Guarantee Company repaid the principal and overdue interest of
2,210,186.43 yuan and 86,000.74 yuan on behalf of YH Company, totaling
2,296,187.17 yuan.
III. Controller's Doer Spirit Analysis
1. Every Cooperation Ends with the Withdrawal of Minority Shareholders.
The organizational form of a limited liability company provides a legal basis for
long-term cooperation between shareholders. In theory, as long as the relationship
among shareholders is harmonious and the business of the company is blameless, the
cooperative shareholders usually stick to the growth and development of the
company. However, due to numerous reasons, there are flaws in the relationship
among shareholders, and the minor shareholders eventually choose to withdraw from
the operation and shares. From the perspective of corporate information transmission,
even minor shareholders know more about inside information than external creditors.
There are two causes for minor shareholders to withdraw: voluntarily or forcibly.
If the minor shareholders withdraw voluntarily, it usually means that the
business prospects of the company or/and the major shareholders are not optimistic,
and they want to stop losses by the foot vote in time. If the minor shareholders are
forced to withdraw from the company, it means that the major shareholders have
moral problems. Therefore, whether minor shareholders voluntarily or forcibly
withdraw from the company, it is the very alert signal when evaluating the company
and its actual controllers. Especially when evaluating the creditworthiness of the
actual controlling shareholder, if each cooperation relationship ends with the
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ultimate departure of the minor shareholders, it can be undoubtedly suspected that
the personality of the controlling shareholders is questionable. It's hard to imagine
that an entrepreneur with doer spirit will end up barren wherever s/he goes. Logically,
if the minor shareholders who cooperate with the actual controller end up with
withdrawal or failure, it is difficult to prevent the controller from taking
opportunistic actions against the interests of lenders and guarantors.
In the above case, Mr. A was the actual controller of YH Company. The
guaranteed enterprise was established in 1996 and the minor shareholder withdrew
from management in the following year (1997). Ten years later (2006), the minor
shareholder transferred all the shares of YH Company and the controller Mr. A
wholly owned YH Company.
At the end of 2011, Mr. A and his Hong Kong partner re-upgraded the restaurant,
and the initial investment of 5.5 million yuan was funded by Hong Kong partners. In
2013, the partner applied for withdrawal. Mr. A returned 5.5 million yuan of
pre-investment funds and half of the original HS restaurant's profits of 5 million
yuan (2.5 million yuan) to the minor shareholder and ended the cooperative
relationship.
2. Lack of Focus and Cross-border Operation
In 2016, when applying for guarantee, YH Company, the guaranteed enterprise,
was mainly engaged in hosiery industry. Before or at that time, the actual controller
Mr. A tried many times to operate across borders. Mr. A had a severely opportunistic
mentality and lacked the necessary dedication and professionalism. YH Company set
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up a new shoe factory at the end of 2010, which was engaged in production after the
Spring Festival of 2011 and closed in the second half of 2014. In September 2011,
Mr. A set up HS restaurant. In late 2011, he rented 1-3 floors of the office buildings
in another town to set up HS Restaurant company. He invested 26 million yuan in
decoration and began trial operation in late 2012. As of September 20, 2017, when
Mr. A defaulted, HS Restaurant and HS Restaurant Co., Ltd. all ended in failures.
According to the first section of this chapter, the spirit of doer is a kind of
dedicated character with the philosophy of " If others succeed by exerting one ounce
of effort, I will exert a hundred times as much effort". A doer will do things that are
recognized as practical, deep-going, long-term, capable and excellent as possible. In
this case, Mr. A had a completely speculative mindset. It is difficult to imagine that
such a person can begin well and end well. Whether dealing with interpersonal
relationships or business economy, he just tasted it and ended up fruitless.
Summary
The zero-loss-principle of financing guarantee requires that FGC should first
strictly screen clients in credit enhancement business, and systematically evaluate the
owners and actual controllers of guaranteed enterprise. According to the business
files of the China Success Guarantee Company, this chapter summarizes the
assessment factors in the credit enhancement model for the owner or actual
controller as the spirit of doer. Doers refer to those who pursue wealth and career
through vigorous efforts and stepwise stability. Typical groups of doers are usually
well-managed small and medium-sized business owners. The spirit of doer refers to
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the enterprising concept of " If others succeed by exerting one ounce of effort, I will
exert a hundred times as much effort", which makes sure that the right things are
done in a practical, deep, long-term, capable and excellent way.
The spirit of doer can promote enterprise to do anything possible to improve
production, management, labor productivity, and to reduce individual labor time in
unit commodities, thereby to improve the position of the enterprise in the market
competition and profit opportunities. To a certain extent, the spirit of doer can make
up for the shortcomings of low educational background and realize the accumulation
of entrepreneur’s human capital. The spirit of doer helps to accumulate social capital.
Therefore, the doer spirit can directly improve the enterprise value through the
learning curve effect and the social capital accumulation effect. The increase in
enterprise value can reduce the credit risk of financing guarantee business. From the
essential and long-term point of view, the spirit of doer matches systematically with
the zero-loss-principle of credit enhancement business. Through the case study of Mr.
A, the major shareholder and controller of YH Company, this chapter verifies the
principle and mechanism of the spirit of doers reducing the credit risk of financing
guarantee business.
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ChapterV Market Competitiveness and Enterprise Credit Enhancement
Firstly, this chapter analyses the implication of market competitiveness, and the
relation between market competitiveness and enterprise value. Secondly, the case
study of B Company shows that the enterprise market competitiveness can be
measured objectively and accurately by two indicators: customer concentration and
net profit margin.
5.1 Market Competitiveness and Enterprise Value
I. Meaning of Market Competitiveness
Market competitiveness means that enterprise provides the right goods or
services with the right quality at the right price on the right time. This means that the
competitive enterprise satisfies customer needs more efficiently and effectively than
others do. Usually in the competitory environment, only by relying on their own
resources or strategic advantages to provide products or services for the market, and
on the basis of optimizing and integrating the market and their own resources, can
enterprise form a market competitiveness characterized by market impact and market
power to achieve profits and sustainable development.
From the financial point of view, enterprise can reduce product cost and
improve product quality by refining production process and technological level,
which not only helps to increase market shares, but also benefits to improve sales
profit margin. The financial performance of enterprise market competitiveness is
good sales trend and high profit margin. In the same market, faced with similar
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customer groups, when enterprise can win higher profit margins than others in the
same industry, it means that it has competitive advantages in the market. Generally
speaking, the larger the market share and the stronger the profitability, the stronger
the market competitiveness. Hence, market competitiveness can improve the
profitability, solvency and sustainability of the enterprise.
According to the 30 selected business archives, 8 of them have a clear
evaluation of the competitiveness of enterprises in the market: 6 of them have strong
competitiveness in the market, one has competitiveness in the market, and another
has been evaluated as having ordinary competitiveness in the market. The other 22
files do not make a clear evaluation of market competitiveness. It can be seen that in
practice, market competitiveness evaluation is a relatively complex process. Only
when the relevant conditions are clear and sufficient, can the enterprise market
competitiveness be evaluated.
In the actual market competition, the development trend of the subdividing
industry has a direct impact on the enterprise market competitiveness. The enterprise
market competitiveness is closely related to market potential and market structure.
For FGC as outsider, market potential and market structure are easier to evaluate to
some extent. Among the 30 files selected, 15 have definite evaluation conclusions on
the market potential, 12 of them have positive evaluation on the market potential of
enterprises. They are commented with "fast growth", "good prospect", "rising trend",
"great potential", "great" and so on. In conclusion, only 2 files give the evaluation
conclusion of "overcapacity" and "transformation" respectively, while the other 15
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materials do not give the conclusion of market potential. As for the evaluation of
market structure, 8 files have evaluation conclusion: 3 of them are competitive,
differentiated or uncertain, 5 of them are centralized and marketed; the other 22 files
don’t have evaluation conclusions.
II. Market Competitiveness and Enterprise Value
Because financing guarantee business is usually short-term business, the focus
of business evaluation is mainly on the impact of enterprise market competitiveness
on business income and profit in the short term, at the same time taking into account
its impact on enterprise value. Financial short-term analysis model is mainly
cost-volume-profit analysis model. According to this model, the enterprise market
competitiveness directly affects the unit price and sales volume in the short term,
thus affecting EBITDA and the net profit, and ultimately influencing EV. The model
is constructed as follows:
Supposing that in the relevant range, enterprise cost can be divided into two
parts: variable versus fixed. And fixed cost is expressed as a, and unit variable cost
expressed as b; assuming unit price is expressed as p, sales volume expressed as x,
and sales revenue expressed as y, then y = px; presuming that total cost function is c,
then c = a + bx. Assuming that enterprise has market competitiveness, its products
always have market for sale and a balance between production and marketing can be
achieved, that is to say, its inventory level remains unchanged for a period of time.
The profit is π, and the model can be expressed as：
π=y-c=px-(a+bx)=(p-b)x-a （5-1）
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According to Formula 5-1, the enterprise market competitiveness can act on
profit π through two variables of p and x, and derive the profit function to p and x,
respectively：
 ′
  
=x （5-2）
Form 5-2 reveals that if an enterprise with sufficient market competitiveness
increases its profits by raising its price, it can increase the EBITDA of x units per
unit of price increase, and the leverage effect of price increase on EBITDA is x. As
shown in Fig. 5-1, a price increase not only reduces the position of break-even point,
but also increases EBITDA in an equal proportion based on sales volume. See the
shadow area of the figure.
 ′
  
=       （5-3）
Form 5-3 reveals that if a competitive enterprise increases its profits by
expanding its sales, the EBITDA of (p-b) units can be increased with each additional
unit of sales volume, and the leverage effect of expanding sales volume on EBITDA
is p-b. In the cost-volume-profit analysis model, p-b is called unit contribution
margin (CM for short), i.e. EBITDA increases with each additional sales volume. As
shown in Figure 5-2, when sales volume increase from x0 to x1, EBITDA increases
from EBITDA0 to EBITDA1 with a leverage factor of p-b.
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Figure 5-1 Impact of Price Rise on EBITDA
Figure 5-2 Impact of Expanding Sales on EBITDA
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If the other conditions remain unchanged, the increase of EBITDA will increase
the net profit, that is to say, the numerator in the enterprise valuation formula will
rise, and thus EV will be increased. According to the relationship between the risk of
financing guarantee business and EV, it can be inferred that: the enterprise market
competitiveness is conducive to reducing the risk of financing guarantee business.
5.2 Case Study on Market Competitiveness and Credit Enhancement
I. Basic Situation of Guarantee Business Case
1. Status of the Guaranteed Enterprise
B Ceramics Company was founded in November 2006. In June 2007, natural
person Mr. H and natural person Mr. T invested 300,000 yuan respectively to acquire
all shares of the company, and each accounted for 50% shares. In November 2008,
Mr. H's cousin invested 300,000 yuan to acquire Mr. T's equity. Mr. T was a
registered shareholder and the real controller was Mr. H.
In 1990, Mr. H began to work in a ceramics factory in Nanzhuang Town of
Foshan, and engaged in the sales of ceramics and chemical raw materials from 1995
to 2003. In 2003, Mr. H went to Heshan to set up F Ceramics Company to engage in
brick production and marketing. F Ceramics Company closed its business in October
2009 due to other reasons. At the end of 2006, Mr. H acquired B Ceramics Company
to engage in brick polishing, processing and marketing.
In July 2008, it established Xinxing County Y Ceramics Company to engage in
brick production and marketing. Y Ceramic Company employed about 1000 people,
and the legal representative and actual controller was natural person Mr. H.
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Another affiliated enterprise, Xinxing J Building Material Company was
registered and established on April 11, 2013. Its business scope was sales of building
materials, processing and sales of building ceramics, and its legal representative and
actual controller was Mr. H.
After nearly seven years of development, B Ceramics Company had three
polishing production lines, 40, 42, 48, respectively, with more than 300 employees.
Products were mainly high-grade dark Bratti polishing bricks. Because dark brick
was mainly used in decoration engineering and building materials, its market and
sales channels were stable, and were not affected by the real estate regulation policy.
Moreover, there were few competitors in the market of high-grade dark brick
subdivision in the industry, and its sales channel was more stable than others in the
same industry.
Compared with 2012, the ceramic industry showed signs of recovery in 2013,
and market orders increased. In order to adapt to the changing market demand,
enterprises produced white polycrystalline stone in 2013. The product structure was
half of dark brick and half of light brick. About 40% of B company's ceramics
products were sold abroad to the Middle East, Southeast Asia and other regions,
mainly 600 dark Bratti. For domestic sales, at that time, four brands had been
registered.
B Ceramics Company is essentially an industrial extension project added by the
actual controller, Mr. H, on the basis of managing Y Company ceramics brick
production. On the one hand, this "private polishing factory" could achieve new
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economic benefits; on the other hand, it could solve the problem of quality
degradation through deep processing and polishing of brick billets with quality
problems to maximize current benefits. At that time, more than 90% of the bricks
purchased by B Company came from Y Ceramics Company.
For ceramic industry, the upgrading of production line and technical
improvement were the key to development. Starting in 2012, the company had
completed two polishing line equipment upgrading; and the remaining one had also
been upgraded by half. Through the renewal of equipment technology, the
production efficiency and product quality were improved, and the competitiveness of
was further enhanced. In 2013, the actual controller Mr. H set up the second
affiliated company in Xinxing County. At that time, the first polishing production
line was being ordered. It was planned to relocate the production line of B Ceramics
Company to factories in Xinxing County one after another, and B Ceramics
Company had no investment plan.
2. The Process of Guarantee Business
B Ceramic Company was the old customer of J Guarantee Company, and the
two parties had been cooperating for 4 years. This business is a continuation. B
Ceramic Company applied for 10 million yuan guarantee to J Guarantee Company.
After credit rating, J Guarantee Company gave the applicant a good credit rating of
BB ratings and qualitative rating of 70.73.
On February 14, 2014, J Guarantee Company signed a guarantee contract with
B Ceramics Company, which stipulated that 7 million yuan of loans and other
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expenses under the Working Capital Loan Contract signed by B Ceramics Company
and Z Bank would be guaranteed by J Guarantee Company. At the same time, it was
agreed that if the breach of contract of B Ceramic Company results in the
compensation of J Guarantee Company, it should repay the full amount of money to
the J Guarantee Company within three days from the date of compensation, as well
as the interest and penalty on the bank loan of the same period. In case of overdue
liquidation, J Guarantee Company had the right to collect liquidated damages from B
Ceramics Company at 0.2% of the compensation amount per day from the date of
overdue liquidation.
At the same time, J Guarantee Company and B Ceramics Company, the two
affiliated enterprises, the actual controller, the affiliated enterprise shareholders
signed the "Maximum Counter-Guarantee Contract", which agreed that B Ceramics
Company provided machinery and equipment and existing and future inventory, and
the affiliated enterprise provided machinery and equipment as collaterals. A number
of real estates under the name of the actual controller and the shareholders of the
affiliated enterprises and the buildings of the guaranteed enterprise were mortgaged
to J Guarantee Company. On the same day, J Guarantee Company signed a
Guarantee Contract with Z Bank to undertake joint guarantee liability for the loan of
B Ceramics Company from Z Bank.
On February 19, 2014, Z Bank granted the loan of 7 million yuan to B
Ceramics Company. The borrowing period was 24 months, and the repayment
method was to repay according to the plan. It was agreed that the principal and
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interest should be repaid on a quarterly basis starting from the sixth month.
On December 18 of 2015, December 21 and January 26 of 2016, Z Bank issued
a Notice of Claim for Compensation to J Guarantee Company. Because B Ceramic
Company could not repay the principal and interest of the matured loan, J Guarantee
Company was required to repay the principal and interest of the loan on behalf of B
Ceramic Company, totaling 2,022,001.23 yuan. J Guarantee Company repaid
202,2001.23 yuan to Z Bank on the same day.
After compensation, B Ceramics Company did not return the full amount to J
Guarantee Company as contracted. J Guarantee Company sued the guaranteed
enterprise, the affiliated enterprises and the actual controller and associated
individuals under counter-guarantee contract to the court. On May 18 of 2016, the
court made a default judgment:
Demanding that B Ceramics Company pay J Guarantee Company the
principal amount of compensation of 2,022,001.23 yuan, as well as interest, penalty
and liquidated damages; the actual controller, affiliated enterprises and affiliated
shareholders bear joint liability for the above debts; J Guarantee Company has
priority of claim in the collaterals under the counter-guarantee contract.
From February 22 to 23 of 2018, the court auctioned a house and three parking
spaces of collaterals. The total revenue from the auction is 5,738,080 yuan. So far,
after four years, the guarantee business was closed.
II. Market Competitiveness Analysis
1. Market Situation of Construction Ceramics Industry
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Since the second half of 2010, great changes have taken place in the pattern of
China's ceramics industry. From the industrial base to the sales market, from brand
management to channel access, a new market pattern has taken shape. Since the state
promulgated energy saving and emission reduction policies in 2010, the
governments of Foshan, Shandong and other ceramics producing areas have
implemented shutdown and transfer of enterprises with high energy consumption
and heavy pollution. The large-scale migration of Foshan building ceramics had
shocked the whole ceramic industry.
As building ceramics industry has always been a labor-intensive industry, it has
always been unable to get rid of the ultimate destiny of relocating to poor areas. With
the rising costs of raw materials, energy, human resources, logistics, environment
and so on, the development of building ceramics industry in Guangdong coastal
areas had reached a limit. According to incomplete statistics, from March 2007 to the
first half of 2013, Foshan ceramics enterprises had migrated to the following areas:
Qingyuan, Deqing, Gaoyao, Gaoan, Fengcheng, Pingxiang, Jingdezhen and Jiujiang.
The total investment was over 25 billion yuan, the total area of the new plan was
close to 40,000 mu (about 26,666,640 square meters) and there were more than 350
designed production lines. In the process of northward migration, Qingyuan and
Xinxing were the earliest regions to undertake the transfer, and also the regions to
take shape firstly in emerging industrial bases.
Judging from the situation at that time (2013), the industry had gradually
formed a number of strong ceramic brands. Among them, Xinzhongyuan was unique
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scenery in the field of polished tiles, Jinyitao was invincible in the field of antique
tiles, Dongpeng had successfully spanned the two fields of architectural ceramics
and bathroom, Wrigley led the trend in the field of bathroom, Huida was exceptional
in the field of bathroom export. And Xinmingzhu, Smick and Marco Polo, Oxonor,
Irvine, Nobel, etc., all were excellent brands.
2. Market Competitiveness Analysis
B Ceramic Company was commonly known as "Private Polishing Factory" in
the industry. It produced dark Bratti bricks and white polycrystalline bricks. Its mode
was similar to other polishing bricks factories. Brick billets are polished into
polished bricks through a series of polishing and grinding processes. After
compressive strength test and damage test, the finished products are packed out of
the factory. After nearly seven years of development, B Ceramic Company had three
polishing production lines, 40, 42, 48 respectively, and had more than 300
employees. The products were mainly high-grade dark polished Bratti bricks.
Because dark bricks were mainly used in decoration engineering and building
materials, their market and sales channels were stable, and they were not affected by
real estate regulation policies.
There were few competitors in the market of high-grade dark brick sector in the
industry, and its sales channel was more stable. In 2013, the ceramic industry
showed signs of recovery and market orders increased. In order to adapt to the
changing market demand, the company produced white polycrystalline stone. The
product structure was half of dark brick and half of light brick. In 2012, the company
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realized sales revenue of 252.12 million yuan and net profit of 12.92 million yuan.
By August 2013, it had realized sales revenue of 158.48 million yuan and net profit
of 7.7 million yuan.
About 40% of the products of B Ceramics Company, mainly 600 dark Bratti,
were sold to the Middle East, Southeast Asia and other regions. For domestic sales,
four brands had been registered. The company had carried out general contracting
sales on these brands, and introduced powerful distributors as their general agents for
external sales. More than 90% of the bricks purchased by B Ceramics Company
came from the affiliated enterprise of Y Ceramics Company. The settlement method
was prepaid, and the bills of promissory notes were paid for 2 months after the
bricks were shipped. Both sides had fair purchasing price and independent
accounting. They were closely related to each other to ensure timely supply of bricks
and billets.
In 2012, the company's top four sales customers were all natural persons. Their
total sales volume and sales revenue were 387,000 square meters and 232,870,000
yuan, respectively. The top four sales accounted for 92.4% of the sales volume of B
Ceramics Company. The top four customers’ sales accounted for 33.11%, 27.68%,
17.42% and 13.84% of sales respectively. The high customer concentration reflected
that the sales channel was too single and the market competitiveness was weak. After
all, for the enterprise in building ceramics industry with low industry concentration,
the profit division between suppliers and distributors was inconsistent. In order to
maximize their profits, the distributors with market power would inevitably depress
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the prices and profits of the suppliers.
Referring to the financial statements provided by B Ceramic Company from
2011 to 2013, the net profit margins of sales, as the final result of the market
competitiveness, were 5.23%, 5.12% and 4.76% respectively. The minute and
deteriorating net profit margin reflected the weak market competitiveness of B
Ceramic Company.
Summery
Market competitiveness means that enterprise provides the right goods or
services with the right quality at the right price on the right time. Market
competitiveness means that enterprise meets the customer needs more efficiently and
more effectively. Market competitiveness can improve the profitability, solvency and
sustainability. Competitive enterprise, whether by raising prices or expanding sales,
can improve EBITDA, thereby improve the short-term solvency and reduce the risk
of financing guarantee business. Most financing guarantee businesses are short-term,
and market competitiveness can significantly improve the short-term performance
indicators, therefore market competitiveness and the zero-loss-principle of credit
enhancement business form a key match. Through the case analysis of B Ceramics
Company, it is found that the enterprise market competitiveness can be measured
objectively and accurately by two indicators of customer concentration and net profit
margin.
121
Chapter VI Technology Suitability and Enterprise Credit Enhancement
6.1 Technology Suitability and Enterprise Value
I. Meaning of Technical Suitability
From an economics point of view, technology refers to the means of converting
input into output in the production process, including hard technology (means of
labor) and soft technology (design, manufacturing methods, technical information).
Technical suitability is the organic unity of technological advancement and economic
efficiency. Technology is a means to improve economic benefits, and the purpose of
developing technology is to improve economic benefits. To achieve the unity of
technological advancement and economic efficiency, that is, to improve
technological suitability is the fundamental direction when enterprises choose or
develop technology.
Technological suitability is the physical basis for linking doer spirit and market
competitiveness. In order to give full play to the role of doer spirit, it must be put
into practice on technology suitability and technology most suitable for enterprise
environmental conditions. Market competitiveness will not arise out of thin air. Its
realistically solid basis is the enterprise technology suitability.
According to the files of guarantee business, the items of evaluating technical
suitability mainly include technical equipment, quality management, technical
certification and management level. As for technical equipment, 18 out of 30 files
have definite evaluation conclusions, including "advanced" (15), "breakthrough" (1),
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"complete" (1), "high-tech" (1); the remaining 12 do not have any conclusion. As for
quality management and technical argumentation, 15 out of 30 files have definite
conclusions, which are "conformity" (11), "medium" (1), "specification" (1), "more
than 30 patents" (1), "brand value" (1). The remaining 15 files don’t have any
evaluation conclusion. As for the management level, 21 of the 30 files have clear
conclusions, which are "normative" (6), "normal" (3), "medium" (1), "robust" (2),
"efficient" (2), "advanced" (5), "skilled" (1), "main research, development and sales,
manufacturing outsourcing" (1).
II. Technical Suitability and Enterprise Value
According to the basic principles of technological economics or engineering
economics, enterprises should evaluate the economic effect of each technology
project they choose. The technological project will be adopted when its net present
value (NPV) is greater than zero or when the highest internal rate of return (IRR) is
achieved. Selecting the technology project of which the financial net present value is
positive and maximized means that the technology project can contribute the
maximized value to enterprise value (EV). Because the method of evaluating the
technology suitability is completely consistent with the method of evaluating the
enterprise value, the technological suitability is directly unified with EV
maximization. In theory, enterprise value is the sum of the net present value of all
technological projects. For FGC, each client-enterprise can be regarded as a
technology project, and the potential enterprises can be screened according to the
principles and methods of engineering economics for screening technology projects,
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so as to provide impartial basis for credit risk assessment and financing guarantee
business decision-making.
Enterprise operation activities are inseparable from capital investment and labor
investment. Under the new normal conditions of China's economy, the suitable
technology can improve the return on assets (ROA) and the wage level of employees
from the perspective of business performance. Return on assets measures how much
net profit is generated from one unit of assets. The formula is: return on assets = net
profit after tax / total assets. The higher the return on assets, the better the effect of
asset utilization, indicating that the enterprise has achieved decent results in
increasing income and saving the use of funds, and vice versa.
In competitive labor market, the wage level directly reflects the quality of
employees. Generally, with the updating of technological equipment and the
improvement of technological level in enterprises, low-quality workers tend to be
replaced by machines. When the number of high-quality workers who operate
advanced machinery and equipment increases and that of high-quality workers
decreases, the proportion of high-quality workers will increase. In addition to the
long-term trend of rising wage level in China, technologically suitable enterprise can
provide higher salary for their employees. Therefore, the return on asset and wage
level are the two basic indicators to measure enterprise technology suitability.
6.2 Case Study on Technology Suitability and Credit Enhancement
I. Basic Situation of Guarantee Business Case
1. Basic Situation of C Clothing Company
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C Clothing Company (C Company for short) was established in January 2004.
It mainly produced and managed various kinds of knitted clothing products. Actual
Controller Mr. L, diligent and willing to specialize, in 1996, when he had one-year
apprenticeship experience in garment craft factories after graduation from middle
school, tried to run garment factory. In the early days of its establishment, due to the
lack of in-depth understanding of the garment industry, C Company once fell into a
slow stage of development. To make up for its shortcomings, Mr. L stationed in
garment factory day and night, from a layman to C company's chief designer and
testing officer. Since its establishment, C company had been growing steadily in the
fierce market competition with its indomitable pioneering spirit. Especially after
2011, advanced JIT single-piece production line and hanging equipment had been
introduced to ensure better product quality and delivery time.
Company C enjoyed a high reputation among its peers. After a good pace of
adjustment, the company had obtained IS09001 quality system certification with
strong technical force and standardized operation process. At the same time, it had
won the favor of domestic and foreign brands. Yishion, Zhenweisi, Birchmei, Beibei
Bear, 361, Delphi and so on are its main partners, among which Yishion and
Baiqimei account for more than 50% of all orders of C Company. Having a fixed
sales channel did not stop the pace of its progress, C company continued to introduce
a number of semi-automatic equipment, in order to ensure the quality of the premises
of further shortening the delivery period, and further expand the production scale.
C Company had developed from a small workshop with only a dozen people to
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a private enterprise with more than 300 people. In addition to having good
production technology and sales channels, it was also closely related to the
innovative and forward-looking thinking of managers. Firstly, the company paid
attention to effective communication between management and grass-roots level,
realizing that the grass-roots feedback could help enterprise correct errors in time;
secondly, the company attached great importance to the training of staff skills, and
carried out a series of training courses from time to time, so that employees could
better adapt to their own work. C Company's performance was relatively stable, in
the medium position in the same industry. Especially in 2011, the introduction of
new computer equipment, effective decomposition process, and control production
speed, offset the regret of slowing the process due to lack of skilled craftsmen.
After China's economy entered a new normal, young people willing to work in
factories were becoming more and more difficult to recruit. Enterprises once fell into
a situation of shortage of manpower. They clearly had endless orders, but had to
cancel them. In view of this situation, Mr. L, the actual controller, believed that only
by constantly replacing manpower with machines could the enterprise have
long-term development. So C Company planned to continue to introduce
semi-automated equipment, in addition to the original four automated production
lines, it was estimated that 50-100 employees could be saved.
Furthermore, due to the buyer's settlement period of 30-60 days, and garment
manufacturing industry needed a large amount of capital to be prepare, once the
capital chain was broken, the company would fall into the awkward situation of
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prolonging the supply period. As a result, in July 2012, the company borrowed a
working capital loan amounted 3 million yuan from local financial institutions for a
period of two years, mainly to supplement the liquidity.
From the domestic demand of the industry, by the end of 2012, with the
stabilization of China's economy, the growth rate of domestic garment sales had
rebounded gradually. According to China Garment Association's understanding of
some garment enterprises order meeting in spring and summer of 2013, due to the
slowdown in demand, the willingness of agents to order declined, and the total order
volume was generally lower than expected. In the second half of 2013, with the
recovery of the economy and the gradual improvement of consumption stimulus
policy, domestic garment consumption would also show a gradual upward trend.
Three-year enterprise data show that sales revenue increased by 15.7741 million
yuan in the same period of 2012 compared with 2011, an increase of 21.5%, and net
profit increased by 35.3 million yuan, an increase of 0.8%. The large increase in
sales revenue had not caused a significant increase in net profit. Firstly, the main
reason was that the price of raw materials and the cost of labor increased, which led
to the increase in sales cost. Secondly, because the profit margin of the apparel
industry was generally not high, small profits and more sales were the usual methods
used by many enterprises. The comprehensive financial indicators were still within
the normal range.
Clothing industry belongs to labor-intensive industry. In 2013, the number of
employees in C Company was 292-301, with the average wage ranging from 2716.7
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to 3239.6 yuan per capita per month. In 2013, the minimum wage in Foshan was
1310 yuan, and the average wage of on-the-job employees was of 4196 yuan. It
could be seen that C company was facing a difficult choice: there was no room to
depress the wages, because it had already faced the situation of difficult recruitment;
the machine replacement scheme would consume a lot of investment, fixed cost
would be raised after a substantial increase in operating leverage, and the sales
volume and sales revenue at the break-even-point would increase rapidly.
Mr. L, the actual controller, also had an associated enterprise, JC Glass
Machinery Company. JC Glass Machinery Company, founded on June 6, 2008, was
a sole proprietorship company. The company mainly produced glass edge grinders,
and the models produced were all general purpose machines. Therefore, the
company could prepare materials before they received orders, and the process of
preparing materials required sufficient liquidity.
According to the information provided, the main business revenue in 2010 was
15.89 million yuan, and the net profit was 2.48 million yuan; in 2011, the main
business revenue was 19.83 million yuan, and the net profit was 2.93 million yuan;
in 2012, the main business income was 31.27 million yuan, and the net profit was
4.42 million yuan.
2. The Process of Guarantee Business
In June 2013, C Company filed a loan guarantee application to J Guarantee
Company. The application amounted 10 million yuan and the period was 36 months.
The repayment method was to repay the principal as planned (paying interest
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monthly, repaying the principal in the first year was 2 million yuan, repaying
500,000 yuan quarterly; repaying the remaining 4 million yuan in the second and
third year respectively, namely repaying 1 million yuan quarterly for the last two
years). After credit evaluation, on July 25, 2013, J Guarantee Company gave C
Company a BBB rating with good credit and a qualitative score of 78.86. It agreed to
provide guarantee for C Company to apply for liquidity loan of 10 million yuan from
Z Bank. The guarantee fee was calculated at 6% of the guaranteed amount, as was
600,000 yuan.
On September 25, 2013, J Guarantee Company and C Company signed the
Guarantee Contract, which stipulated that J Guarantee Company would provide
joint guarantees for loans of 10 million yuan and other expenses under the Working
Capital Loan Contract signed by C Company and Z Bank on September 25, 2013. If
the default of C Company resulted in the compensation of J Guarantee Company, C
Company should repay the full amount of money to J Guarantee Company within
three days from the date of compensation, as well as the interest and penalty on the
bank loan of the same period from the date of compensation. In case of overdue
liquidation, J Guarantee Company had the right to collect liquidated damages from C
Company at 0.2% of the compensation amount per day from the date of overdue
liquidation. On the same day, J Guarantee Company signed a Guarantee Contract
with Z Bank to provide joint guarantee liability for the loan of C Company. On
October 8 of the same year, Z Bank granted a loan of 10 million yuan to C Company.
In order to protect rights and interests, J Guarantee Company signed the
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following counter-guarantee contracts with the actual controllers and other
stakeholders of C Company:
(1) On September 25, 2013, J Guarantee Company signed the
"Counter-guarantee Contract" with C Company and five shareholders, which agreed
to provide joint liability guarantees for the debts of C Company to J Guarantee
Company;
(2) On September 25, 2013, signed the "Maximum Counter-Guarantee
Contract" with the actual controller and his spouse, and agreed to mortgage four
shops and five parking spaces under their name to J Guarantee Company, which had
been registered for mortgage;
(3) on September 17, 2013, signed the "Maximum Counter-Guarantee Contract"
with C Company, which stipulated that C Company should mortgage its existing and
future inventories to J Guarantee Company;
(4) on October 30, 2014, signed the Contract of Maximum Counter-Guarantee
with C Company, which stipulated that C Company would provide J Guarantee
Company with the Maximum Counter-Guarantee Mortgage for the batch of
machinery and equipment under its name, and had already registered the mortgage;
(5) On October 30, 2014, signed the Contract of Maximum Counter-guarantee
with the actual controller and his spouse, which stipulated that two of them would
mortgage their real estate to J Guarantee Company;
(6) On September 25, 2013, signed a "Maximum Counter-Guarantee Contract"
with Company C, stipulating that the existing and future accounts receivable and
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other accounts receivable generated by the production and operation of C Company
within the next five years from the date of issuance of the loans referred to in the
contract would provide counter-guarantee to J Guarantee Company, and the
registration had been completed.
On June 5, 2015, Z Bank issued a Notice of Claim for Compensation to J
Guarantee Company, requesting J Guarantee Company to compensate the borrowing
principal of C Company amounted 890,430.69 yuan and the fine interest of 3,623.56
yuan, totaling 894,054.25 yuan. J Guarantee Company compensated Z Bank the
amount on the same day.
According to the counter-guarantee contract, if the recovery is failed, J
Guarantee Company would sue the parties of the counter-guarantee contracts to the
court. On July 9, 2015, the court rendered a default judgment:
(1) C Company should repay the principal of compensation and interest,
penalty and liquidation damages to J Guarantee Company within three days from
the effective date of this judgment; (2) Other guarantors under the
counter-guarantee contract should bear joint liability for the above-mentioned debts;
(3) J Guarantee Company, as the first creditor, had the priority right to be repaid for
the price of the collateral (the current assets of shops, garages, houses, affiliated
enterprises, machinery and equipment of C Company and accounts receivable) after
discount, auction or sale.
After the judgment comes into effect, the execution process of the judgment
becomes tortuous. On May 26, 2017, the court received an execution objection from
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the outsider LYZ, who believed that he had acquired 20% of the property rights of
the mortgaged property. The court's auction of the property damaged his legitimate
rights and interests. On May 23, 2018, the outsider filed suits in the Intermediate
Court. Finally, on July 19, 2018 and February 25, 2019, the court issued notice of the
auction of the mortgaged shops respectively. On December 31, 2018, some collateral
(parking spaces, shops) began to be auctioned online, with a total amount of
3,998,890 yuan. The guarantee business started in June 2013 and ended in March
2019. It had spanned six years and gone through many setbacks. This profoundly
shows that the occurrence of compensation and breaking the zero-loss-principle is
undoubtedly a nightmare for FGCs.
II. Technology Suitability Analysis
1. Hardware Equipment
As shown in Table 6-1, in 2013 C Company had 816 machines and equipment
of various types, with a total value of more than 71.0 million yuan. According to the
relevant announcement of the Market Supervision and Administration, the 816
machines and equipment were registered as mortgages on October 30, 2014, and the
mortgagee was J Guarantee Company. From the aspect of purchasing unit price, the
highest price of a single piece of equipment was 35,000 yuan. Background
information showed that all equipment did not have invoices, at least it could be
explained that there were no invoices when purchasing equipment, or the invoice
management was not prudent. Regardless of which case, it showed that the company
did not attach enough importance to machinery and equipment management. The
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low value of machinery and equipment and insufficient attention easily led to the lag
of hardware and equipment technology and the development hindrances. After
introducing the new computer equipment in 2011, the company continued to
introduce semi-automation equipment in the second half of 2013. The fact proved
that this kind of passive adjustment to the problem of rising labor costs and difficulty
in recruiting workers on hardware equipment was too late.
Table 6-1 Hardware Equipment List of C Company (2013)
No. Hardware Equipment Quantity Unit price (yuan) Total value (yuan)
1 Hang System 150 19,600 2,940,000
2 Computerized flat car 356 4,300 1,530,800
3 Cart Style-1 84 13,500 1,134,000
4 Cart Style-2 115 5,500 632,500
5 Double needle car 10 5,000 50,000
6 Double Needle Chain Bottom 6 3,000 18,000
7 Knife cart 6 2,490 14,940
8 Zigzag Sewing Machine 15 2,500 37,500
9 Five-lane Car 5 6,500 32,500
10 Third-lane car 2 5,500 11,000
11 Double Needle and Trouser Head Car 10 13,800 138,000
12 Button Car 8 6,500 52,000
13 Knob Car 4 30,000 120,000
14 Injection truck 8 600 4,800
15 Jujube cart 5 28,000 140,000
16 Zhanggen Car 2 20,000 40,000
17 Paper press 1 29,990 29,990
18 Wire blower 3 5,000 15,000
19 Needle tester 1 35,000 35,000
20 Cloth inspecting machine 2 28,000 56,000
21 Loosening machine 3 11,000 33,000
22 Hot bed 20 2,000 40,000
summation 7,105,030
Source: J Guarantee Company Guarantee Business Survey Report.
2. Management Technology
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Financial management lost efficacy. The idea of borrowing short-term debt to
support equipment-update in the context of continued declines in return on asset
(ROA) was wrong in itself. According to the data, the ROA of C Company in 2011
was 23.9%, which dropped to 11.0% in 2012. The downward trend of C Company in
2013 was not meaningfully improved. Given the high financing costs of SMEs, in
the case of declining ROA, enterprises should have acted prudently and could not
easily borrow and increase financial leverage. The graver mistake was that C
Company intended to add automation equipment with part of short-term loans. This
mismatch strategy of "short-term borrowing and long-term using" easily led to
bankruptcy due to the breakdown of funds chains once the company ran into some
unfavorable shocks.
Outsourcing management was backward. C Company took most of orders for
their own production. Generally, about 30% of the orders needed to be outsourced in
summer. According to the owner, Mr. L, it was difficult to control the quality of
outgoing parts. Some manufacturers were unwilling to assume after-sales
responsibility, resulting in the re-processing of returned parts, which wasted both
resources and time. Therefore, the company planned to increase production capacity
and reduce outsourcing.
Personnel management failed. C Company was charged with unprovoked
arrears in the remuneration of eight employees in August 2015. C Company refused
to attend the lawsuit without justifiable reasons, and the court made a default
judgment: C Company should pay 86,380 yuan of wages owed to the eight plaintiffs;
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C Company should pay 12,9880 yuan of economic compensation for the termination
of labor relations with the two plaintiffs; and C Company should bear the litigation
expenses.
3. Indicator Evaluation
The return on assets of C Company was 23.9% in 2011, 11.0% in 2012 and
9.9% in the first five months of 2013, showing a continuous declining trend. The
average wage in March 2013 was 3239.6 yuan, which was basically the same as the
average annual wage of urban private sector employees in China in 2013 (32706
yuan). This indicated that most employees were ordinary workers with low technical
literacy.
Summary
Technology is a means of converting input into output in the production process.
Achieving the unity of technological advancement and economic efficiency is the
fundamental direction when enterprises choose and develop technology. Technical
suitability is the physical basis of connecting doer spirit and market competitiveness.
According to the basic principles of technological economics or engineering
economics, enterprise should evaluate the economic effect of each technology
project they choose. In theory, enterprise value is the sum of the net present value of
all technological projects of the enterprise. Therefore, technology suitability and the
maximization of enterprise value are directly unified.
Under the new normal conditions of China's economy, the technology
suitability can improve the return on assets and the wage level of employees from
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the perspective of business performance. Return on assets and wage level are two
straightforward indicators to measure the technological suitability. Through the case
study of C Company, it is found that enterprise without technology suitability
displays signs of imbalance in many aspects of machinery and equipment, financial
management, personnel management, outsourcing management. The imbalance
directly increases enterprise vulnerability and risk level. The ultimate consequences
of technology imbalance are the reduced return on assets and low average wage
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level.
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Chapter VI Concluding Remarks and Research Prospects
7.1 Concluding Remarks
Under China's current financial system, which is dominated by indirect
financing and creditor's rights financing, combining with underdeveloped social
credit system and imperfect credit risk management instruments, SMEs financing is
very difficult. Financing guarantee can alleviate the SMEs financing problem to a
certain extent, and it has the nature of quasi-public service. At present, China defines
financing guarantee as profit-making business and encourages private capital and
private enterprises to develop financing guarantee business. Private financing
guarantee company (FGC) must strictly follow the zero-loss-principle to carry out
business, otherwise they will not survive.
The principle of zero loss essentially requires the financing guarantee company
to give special attention to the key value driving factors of client-enterprises, such as
human factors, market competition factors and technological factors. Combining
with the business cases of China Success Guarantee Company, this paper
summarizes the above three factors as doer spirit, market competitiveness and
technology suitability.
As shown in Figure 7-1, the principle of zero loss is the core of financing
guarantee business, while the spirit of doer, market competitiveness and technology
suitability are the realistic assurance of implementing the principle. Among them, the
spirit of doer is the commander-in-chief, technology suitability is the means, and
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market competitiveness is the driving force and guidance.
Figure 7-1 Three Factors of Financing Guarantee Credit Enhancement Model
The principle of zero loss does not deny the existence value of FGC; on the
contrary, it highlights the service value of FGC. Financing guarantee companies are
professional service organizations providing credit rating, credit enhancement and
certification services, etc. Taking the principle of zero loss as the core, it is of great
significance to establish and improve the service-oriented FGCs, financing guarantee
system and financing guarantee business aiming at alleviating financing difficulties
of SMEs and perfecting social credit system.
7.2 Research Prospects
Through thorough analysis, this paper argues that the credit enhancement
business of FGC is a "pure service", and the principle of zero loss must be fully
Zero-loss-
Principle
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implemented in its business operation process. Whether in the future the Chinese
government still defines the financing guarantee as a profit-making business or
redefines it as non-profit quasi-public service, the private FGCs that run the
financing guarantee business should fully implement the zero-loss-principle.
Understandably, the three-factor credit enhancement model summarized in this paper
only proves some directions. The focus of future research is to build and improve the
evaluation indicator system for each factor according to the actual needs of
economic and social development, so as to make the indicator system compatible
with big data technology and keep synchronous development.
Although the present study gives a preliminary evaluation framework, it can
well explain the ups and downs of China's financing guarantee industry. Especially
from the second half of 1995 to 2014, China's financing guarantee industry entered a
stage of coexistence of growth and disorder. The main reason for the growth and
disorder is that neither the government nor the FGC has clarified that the essence of
financing guarantee is "pure service" rather than insurance business, and the
principle of zero loss must be fully implemented in the course of business operation.
As a result, after China's economy entered a new normal stage, the default rate and
the compensation rate of FGCs increased sharply, and a large number of private
FGCs went bankrupt or suspended business. So did the loan risk of commercial
banks. Originally, the financing guarantee system aimed at dispersing risks, on the
contrary it led to the accumulation of risks.
Since 2015, in the context of economic downturn and reduced export demand,
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the survival pressure of SMEs has increased sharply, and the non-performing rate of
bank loans has continued to rise. Under these conditions, FGCs are cautious about
business development and take the initiative to reduce the loan guarantee scale for
fear of sharp rise in compensation rates. According to the credit enhancement model,
the equilibrium between supply of and demand for financing guarantee business is a
circle, along which the principle of zero loss can be observed. Those enterprises that
do not meet the requirements of credit enhancement model are excluded from the
circle (financing guarantee supply screening mechanism), and those that fully meet
the requirements of credit enhancement model but can also meet the loan conditions
of credit institutions are inside the circle because they have no financing guarantee
demand (financing guarantee demand screening mechanism). The equilibrium
boundary between supply and demand of financing guarantee varies with the change
in business cycle and has strong pro-cyclicality. Hence, the financing guarantee
industry, like the credit industry, does not have counter-cyclical balancing
mechanism.
Taking Guangdong Province as an example, according to the "Development
Report of Guangdong Credit Guarantee Industry 2015", by the end of December
2014, 126 legal entities of FGCs (including 10 state-owned and state-owned holding
guarantee institutions) had submitted data through the information reporting system
of SMEs credit guarantee institutions. At the end of 2014, the total registered capital
was 18.799 billion yuan. 116 FGCs, accounting for 92.06% of the provincial
guarantee institutions, had registered capital of more than 100 million yuan. The
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government finance or state-owned holding enterprises contributed 2.038 billion
yuan, accounting for 10.84% of the total registered capital. The rest were invested by
natural persons and private enterprises. In 2014, the operating income of FGCs was
1.198 billion yuan, down by 57.51% from the same period last year. In 2014, assets
totaled 2.354 billion yuan, down by 50.94% from the same period last year;
liabilities totaled 3.267 billion yuan, down by 64.56% from the same period last year;
owner's equity 2.027 billion yuan, down by 47.71% from the same period last year.
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Figure 7-2 Main Economic Indicators of Financing Guarantee Industry in
Guangdong Province, 2004-2014
As shown in Figure 7-2, from 2004 to 2014, Guangdong credit guarantee
industry had experienced a rapid development stage and a sharp adjustment and
modification stage. The number of FGCs increased from 75 in 2004 to 310 in 2010,
increasing 3.1 times in six years, with an average annual growth rate of 26.7%.
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However, by 2014, the number of FGCs decreased to 194, decreased by 37.4% from
2010. The amount guaranteed increased from 24.9 billion yuan in 2005 to 268.3
billion yuan in 2011, an increase of 98.8 times in six years, with an average annual
growth rate of 48.6%, but it dropped to 77.3 billion yuan in 2014, a decrease of
71.2% compared with 2011. The revenue of guarantee business increased from 470
million yuan in 2005 to 3.84 billion yuan in 2011, which increased by 7.2 times in
six years with an average annual growth rate of 41.9%, but it dropped to 1.2 billion
yuan in 2014, 68.8% decrease compared with 2011.
Looking forward, with the zero-loss principle as the core, the three-factor credit
enhancement model of FGC discussed in this paper needs to be further studied in the
future. Besides the improvement of the three-factor indicators, more research space
exists in the research, discussion and redefinition of the implications and content of
credit enhancement service of FGC. Under the background of Internet plus, big data
and service economy, it is of great significance and profound influence to further
study and explore the industry boundary, business mode and empowerment
technology of FGC credit enhancement service.
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